

This Inspection Readiness Plan (IRP) applies to all Naval facilities worldwide. Additional information specific to Host Country facility concerns are addressed in the CIO's Tab, Tab S, and where applicable for other functions that may be impacted

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is important that the facility being inspected execute this Inspection Readiness Plan immediately upon receipt of a Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection notification. Many of the initial activities are time-sensitive and require top-level command attention to ensure adequate support. Therefore, immediately perform the following: review this Executive Summary, then start by executing the Commanding Officer's Checklist.

This Inspection Readiness Plan (IRP) supports Department of the Navy (DON) commands and programs in executing the DON Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspection methodology. The plan is in a modified OPLAN format, consisting of appropriate checklists, tabs, and information summaries. *The IRP is designed for DON facilities that have not developed their own inspection readiness or treaty compliance plans.* The plan:

- Outlines the recommended steps that DON facilities should take if they are identified for a challenge inspection under the CWC
- Provides guidance on how commands can best respond to short-notice chemical weapons (CW) challenge inspections
- Includes information on DON support available to the command during the inspection process.

BACKGROUND

CWC challenge inspections are short-notice, potentially intrusive inspections that are designed to address compliance concerns regarding the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, or transfer of chemical weapons (CW). The inspections take place when a Signatory State Party to the CWC makes a request to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW, which oversees the implementation of the CWC, will use an International Inspection Team (IIT) similar to the United Nations inspection teams. CWC challenge inspections may occur at any DON facility, regardless of whether it has been involved in CW work. In the event of a challenge inspection, expeditious action by the command is critical to ensure that the U.S. demonstrates compliance with treaty obligations while also

meeting all legitimate and required safety and security requirements. During point of entry (POE) activities and throughout the time the IIT is at the facility being inspected, a group of U.S. Government representatives, referred to as the Host Team, will be responsible for negotiating with and accompanying the OPCW inspection team. At DOD facilities, a Joint Staff or Office of the Secretary of Defense representative (Flag officer or equivalent) will act as the Host Team Leader. The Naval Treaty Implementation Program (NTIP) will send a senior representative to the POE to represent the Commanding Officer (CO) on the Host Team. This representative will transmit to the CO of the facility being inspected the requested inspection perimeter as soon as it is received. This will allow the command to immediately focus their preparation efforts inside the requested inspection area. NOTE: The U.S. has the right to propose an alternative perimeter to the one requested by the IIT.

The CO retains ultimate responsibility for the safeguarding of national security information and the safe conduct of the inspection. In addition, program managers are responsible for protecting national security and sensitive information regarding their programs through in-place Acquisition Project Plans or other appropriate means.

From the time they arrive at the POE and throughout the inspection process, an Escort Team having members from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) will escort the IIT. This team will serve as the national focal point for escort functions during the in-country period. It is the Escort Team's responsibility to arrange, finance, and coordinate all off-facility logistics, administrative requirements and other needs for the IIT. The Facility CO should plan for and be prepared to provide additional on-base assistance for the IIT when they arrive.

*ACTION (1): The facility must initiate "self-monitoring" no later than 12 hours after the IIT arrives at the POE. Self-monitoring consists of creating physical logs in a manner that will provide a permanent record (i.e., traffic logs, videotapes, air operations logs, and/or harbor logs) of all vehicular traffic *exiting* the requested inspection perimeter. Those records must be provided to the IIT when they arrive.*

The IIT will be transported to the perimeter of the challenged site within 36 hours of IIT arrival at the POE. *The IIT should be accorded the standard protocol provided foreign visitors with diplomatic immunity (Tab N).*

ACTION (2): Upon arrival at the inspection site and before the commencement of the inspection, the facility is required to provide a pre-inspection briefing to the IIT, the Escort Team, and the Host Team concerning facility security, safety, and billeting arrangements. NOTE: Immediately upon arrival at the final (or alternative) perimeter, whichever occurs first, the IIT has the right to conduct perimeter activities (i.e., outside the perimeter), but it does not have the right to cross the perimeter before the time stated as being the actual commencement of the inspection period.

If the perimeter is not agreed to at the POE, negotiations continue to establish a final perimeter. The Host Team and the IIT will also negotiate an inspection plan. An inspector's request for access inside the final perimeter will normally be accommodated to the maximum extent possible. Thus, *ACTION (3): the inspected facility should undertake the necessary preparations to safeguard all sensitive non-CW-related areas, and should be prepared to offer alternative methods or evidence of compliance for any areas to which access must be denied.* The Facility CO will play a key role in the perimeter and inspection plan negotiation process, which can last up to 72 hours.

ACTION (4): The IIT must be provided access within the final perimeter no later than 108 hours after its arrival at the POE. IIT inspection within the perimeter may continue for up to 84 continuous hours. The command must provide escorts to facilitate the inspection and represent the facility's CO inside the final perimeter. Verification and inspection activities may include, but are not necessarily limited to record reviews; personnel interviews; photography; sampling; and the physical inspection of structures, areas, and equipment inside the inspection boundary.

The IIT will prepare preliminary inspection findings, which will provide a factual rendition of the inspection (e.g., "The inspectors inspected Building XYZ at Facility ABC"). The preliminary findings will not draw conclusions with regard to treaty compliance. As soon as possible after presenting its preliminary findings, the IIT will depart the facility. The OPCW must submit its draft inspection report to the USG within 20 days of the completion of the inspection. The report will be made available to the USG for review and comment.

CONCLUSION

The CWC challenge inspection regime provides for intrusive verification measures, which the U.S. supports as a means of deterring other State Parties from undertaking treaty-prohibited activities. Consequently, the United States Navy is bound by the same obligations and verification provisions designed to deter and detect noncompliant States Parties.

No provision of the CWC treaty text, U.S. implementing legislation, DOD or DON instruction or regulation relieves a Commanding Officer of any of his responsibilities including the responsibility to protect classified or sensitive information.

The Escort Team, a Tiger Team, and this IRP will assist COs in fulfilling two national objectives:

- Protection of sensitive and classified national security information
- Demonstration of compliance with the CWC.

Within hours of initial notification, the DON Tiger Team will be en route to the inspection facility. The Tiger Team is assigned temporary duty status under the Facility CO and will assist the CO in all phases of the inspection. The Tiger Team's goals are to minimize the inspection impact on facility operations, to ensure the Commanding Officer's concerns are adequately addressed at the appropriate level of the arms control chain of command, and to assist the facility in preparing for the inspection. The makeup of the various teams is described in detail in the Basic Plan of this IRP.

This IRP is applicable to *all* facilities in the DON. References to individual or facility position descriptions are generic in nature. It is recognized that at any given facility the terms Commanding General, Commander, Area Commander, or District Commander may be more appropriate than Commanding Officer, and that billet descriptions often differ from actual functional staff descriptions.

The IRP is consistent in language with pertinent DON CWC inspection support documentation. It is a reference tool designed so users can readily locate and detach individual sections to copy and distribute to appropriate personnel.

The IRP is organized as follows:

- Executive Summary
- Basic Plan
- CWC Challenge Inspection Support Checklists (Tabs A through O)
- Common Questions and Answers About the CWC (Tab P)
- References (Tab Q)
- Glossary (Tab R)
- Overseas Facility Concerns (Tab S)

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
CHINFO	Chief of Naval Information
CI	Challenge Inspection
CIO	Challenge Inspection Officer
CO	Commanding Officer
CW	Chemical weapons
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DOE	Department of Energy
DON	Department of the Navy
ECBFAC	Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensics Analytical Center
EEFI	Essential elements of friendly information
EIF	Entry into force
EPITS	Essential Programs Information and Technical Subsystems
FCC	Federal Communication Commission
GC/MS	Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometer
GPS	Global Positioning System
GRP	Geographic reference point
IIT	International Inspection Team
IPS	Inspection Planning Staff
IRP	Inspection Readiness Plan
NA	National Authority
NAVFAC	Naval Facilities Command
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NLT	No later than
NOTAM	Notice to Airmen
NSC	National Security Council
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPLAN	Operations plan
OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OPSEC	Operations Security
Ops	Operations
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
POC	Point of contact

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS — *Continued*

POE	Point of entry
RCA	Riot control agent
SAC	Special agent in charge
SITREP	Situation report
SSP	Strategic Systems Program
TIMS	Treaty Information Management System
TOC	Treaty Operations Center
TSCM	Technology surveillance countermeasures
U.S.	United States
USG	United States Government
XO	Executive Officer