

Tab S

CHALLENGE INSPECTION OFFICER (CIO)

For Facilities Located in a Host Country

Tab S provides the CIO with a chronological checklist of procedures to manage and coordinate the hosting of a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Challenge Inspection at a facility located in a Host Country. Within hours of initial notification of impending inspection, a Department of the Navy (DON) Tiger Team will be en route to the inspection site to assist with planning and preparation efforts. The Tiger Team consists of CWC inspection experts who will assist the command throughout the inspection. Status of the Tiger Team, including the estimated arrival time, may be determined by calling the Naval Treaty Implementation Program (202) 764-0910, DSN 764-0910. The secondary number is (202) 764-0920, DSN 764-0920. For more specific information on the Tiger Team and the assistance it provides, see Appendix A1.

RESPONSIBILITIES

The CIO is designated by the Commanding Officer (CO) and is responsible for the overall management and coordination of the challenge inspection preparation and support activities. The CIO is the CO's primary representative during the course of a CWC challenge inspection. The position requires the appropriate level of authority to ensure proper coordination within the command. If appropriate, the Executive Officer (XO) should be designated as the CIO. Specific CIO duties include the following:

- Supervise those time-sensitive activities (perimeter self-monitoring, Inspection Ops Center setup, formation of the Inspection Planning Staff [IPS]) that must be accomplished by the facility before the arrival of the Tiger Team.
- Supervise the preparation and presentation of the pre-inspection briefings.
- Provide direction to all the major inspection activities being coordinated/managed within the Inspection Ops Center throughout the entire inspection.
- Assist the CO during the perimeter negotiations process (Phases 2 and 3).
- Conduct after-action reviews of inspection activities and develop lessons learned.

Major Difference for Facilities Located in a Host Country

Host Country Agreements: Host Country Agreements are bilateral agreements that establish ground rules for cooperation between the United States and a Host Country during a CWC Challenge Inspection. The specific provisions of the Host Country agreement differ for each country, and these agreements may or may not be legally binding. It is important that you immediately obtain a copy of your Host Country agreement (a classified document) as a first step toward understanding the provisions and assignments of responsibilities during the inspection. The terms of the Host Country Agreement define what you can and can not do in response to a Challenge Inspection.

Commander In Chief (CINC) Involvement: During an inspection at a facility in a Host Country, you should expect the involvement of your CINC as well as many other staff members in your chain of command. Operational orders may already have been issued by your CINC or component command. It is important to remember that the chain of command has not changed as a result of an inspection. Nothing herein alters the command responsibilities of your facilities Commanding Officer. The Host Team Leader will probably be from CINC staff. A CINC Representative, if not designated as the Team Leader, is sure to be a member on the Host Team and will be coming to your facility along with the International Inspection Team (IIT).

Representative at the Host Country Meeting: The territorial scope of challenge inspections is unlimited and may extend to "any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a state party requested by another state party." What is inspected within the perimeter of a facility or location is determined through negotiations between the OPCW IIT, the designated inspected party, and the Host Country (if applicable and required). For challenge inspections at facilities located in a Host Country, Host Country Agreements will endeavor to establish procedures to include United States Government (USG) representatives in perimeter negotiations, regardless of the designated inspected state party. A meeting may be held by your Host Country to discuss the terms found in the Challenge Inspection Mandate. It is important that your facility monitor message traffic and is prepared to send representatives to any Host Country Meetings.

National Escorts and U.S. National escorts: The Host Country agreement will define the sharing of escort duties between the U.S. National Escorts and the escorts that will be provided by your Host Country. It is important that you immediately obtain a copy of your Host Country agreement (a classified document) as a first step toward understanding escort responsibilities. In general, the Host Country Escorts will provide transportation, lodging, and, meeting room space for the IIT during the time they are in the Host Country. In general, the U.S. National Escorts will accompany the IIT and, in conjunction with the facility Commanding Officer, will assist in providing transportation, lodging, and meeting room space if needed during the time whenever the IIT is located on a U.S. military base.

Self-Monitoring: At many facilities in a Host Country, the likelihood of Host Country participation in Self-Monitoring is high. In some cases, the Host Country may assume complete responsibility for monitoring. The Self-Monitoring Coordinator should quickly determine who is responsible for conducting monitoring activities and identify any potential problems to the CIO.

Tiger Team: The Naval Treaty Implementation Program (NTIP) was organized to draw together individuals with both a comprehensive knowledge in chemical weapons and a full understanding of the Treaty language. NTIP has created a Tiger Team that is home based in the Washington DC area. Its membership is composed of military, government, and contractor employees that train to assemble at a local staging area within 4 hours after the receipt of a challenge inspection notification. The availability of commercial airlines and/or military flights to your nearest airport from Washington DC will determine the time delay involved in getting the team to your facility. The checklist actions discussed in this appendix and in the remainder of this Inspection Readiness Plan (IRP) should not be delayed because the Tiger Team has not arrived.

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS): Your local NCIS agents have received specific training on CWC challenge inspections and are prepared to assist you and your command. They can provide valuable assistance to you until the Tiger Team arrives and throughout the inspection.

The above general differences for facilities in a Host Country are incorporated in this Tab and should be kept in mind as you execute this Tab.

BACKGROUND

DON facilities selected for a CWC challenge inspection are unlikely to be familiar with the provisions of the verification regime or the planning and implementation steps necessary to host a CWC challenge inspection. DON facilities located in a Host Country face unique challenges that will vary based on theater and Host Country requirements. The checklist in this IRP are designed to get facility personnel working productively on the unfamiliar inspection process before the arrival of the DON CWC inspection support Tiger Team. The Tiger Team should be en route to your facility to assist the command within the first twelve hours following notification of intent to conduct an inspection. Command input to POE discussions will be based on theater and Host Country procedures.

NOTES

Naval Treaty Implementation Program (SP-2025)

TOC Phone: (202) 764-0920

Admin: (202) 764-0910

DSN 764-0920

Challenge Inspection Officer's (CIO) Checklist

Phase 1 — Notification/Initial Planning & Response

--	--	--	--	--	--

PHASE 1

PHASE 2

PHASE 3

PHASE 4

PHASE 5

PHASE 6

Phase 1 is the time period from initial notification to the start of self-monitoring. Self-monitoring must begin NLT 12 hours after the International Inspection Team (IIT) arrives at the U.S. point of entry (POE).

The IIT has a 72-hour period for perimeter activities upon arrival, followed by up to 84 hours in which to inspect the facility and satisfy its mandate. Toward this end, it is conceivable that negotiators could elect to conduct inspection activities over a 24-hour period vice normal or extended working hours. This information is provided for consideration when picking personnel to fill billets on the Inspection Planning Staff (IPS). Manning details are provided in respective tabs and checklists.

INITIAL NOTIFICATION

1. **Contact the Naval Treaty Implementation Program**

If directed by your Commanding Officer (CO), contact the Naval Treaty Implementation Program (NTIP)(SP-2025). Not only can NTIP give you expert advice on CWC compliance and implementation, you will also receive the latest information on Tiger Team composition and their travel itinerary. The Treaty Operations Center (TOC) telephone number is (202) 764-0920. The DSN is 764-0920. The unclassified fax number is (202) 764-0930.

NOTES

2. Inform appropriate chain of command

There should already exist a theater-specific notification plan at your facility that you should follow in the event of a CWC Challenge Inspection. Make sure that you know those procedures. Look for possible Country-specific procedures also. Contact the naval component command in theater if you do not have, or do not understand, the theater procedures. Inform tenant activities and neighboring commands of the pending inspection. Ensure that SP-2025 (plad: NAVARMSCONTROLCOORD WASHINGTON DC//SP2025//) is included as an INFO addressee for all inspection-related message traffic sent from your facility.

3. Inform Host Country officials, as appropriate.....

Your theater-specific (and country-specific) procedures govern interaction with Host Country officials in the event of a CWC challenge inspection. Locate and execute.

4. View the "Preparing Department of the Navy Facilities for a Chemical Weapons Convention Challenge Inspection" video

As time allows, view this NTIP video to gain an overview of the CWC and initial preparation requirements. Contact NTIP if you need a copy.

5. Designate your Inspection Planning Staff (IPS).....

The inspection preparation process requires that key individuals be identified, provided with appropriate checklists, and instructed to begin implementing their IRP checklists immediately upon notification of a pending Challenge Inspection. In many cases, the selection will be straightforward; the facility Communications Officer is the preferred choice as the IPS Communications Officer, for example. The selections will be based on finding responsible, experienced, take-charge individuals who are available and can step into an unfamiliar role and achieve results. One individual should be assigned to each of the key positions identified in **(a)** through **(o)** as follows. A summary review list including the suggested number of copies to make for each tab may be found in step **10**.

NOTES

(a) Self-Monitoring Coordinator

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB F

Self-Monitoring of the exits of the requested perimeter is the most urgent treaty-required inspection activity. Self-Monitoring should be implemented immediately by facility personnel. The Self-Monitoring Coordinator ensures that the egress from the Challenge Inspection area is properly monitored and/or sealed according to plan. This planning should begin immediately once you have obtained the perimeter dimensions of the Challenge Inspection area from your message traffic. Your facility Self-Monitoring operations must commence NO LATER THAN 12 hours after the IIT arrives at the Point Of Entry (POE) per treaty regulations. Again, watch your message traffic for the date and time specified as IIT arrival at the POE.

The Self-Monitoring Coordinator should be an individual who knows the facility physical layout and has worked with both the facility police staff and with local law enforcement agencies. It is suggested that the facility Security Officer or Provost Marshal be one of the first choices for designation as the Self-Monitoring Coordinator (Tab F, Self-Monitoring).

(b) Inspection Ops Center Coordinator

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB C

The Inspection Ops Center Coordinator is responsible for immediate setup and continuing management of the Inspection Ops Center, which is the command, control, communications, and coordination focal point of the inspection. The Inspection Ops Center Coordinator needs to immediately begin executing the Inspection Ops Center Checklist (Tab C, Inspection Ops Center).

(c) Communications Officer

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB K

The Communications Officer is responsible for establishing Inspection Ops Center telephone, facsimile, and modem lines; establishing a mobile radio net for escort and prep team use; and detailing communications personnel round-the-clock as needed. The NTIP Tiger Team will bring additional Navy owned radio, cellular phone, portable computers, and other communication equipment with them.

Approval for the Tiger Team to bring transmitting equipment on base is one of the many assignments of the Communication Officer, who should immediately start executing the Communications Checklist (Tab K).

NOTES

(d) Base Prep Coordinator

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB D

The Base Prep Coordinator is in charge of the base preparation process. The Base Prep Coordinator ensures that areas designated to be inspected per the negotiated inspection plan are prepared to provide access to the IIT while protecting classified, sensitive, and proprietary programs and equipment from inadvertent disclosure. These objectives must be achieved while minimizing disruption of normal operations, activities, and personnel schedules. The Base Prep Coordinator works closely with Operations Security (OPSEC), Security, and Safety personnel. Experience has demonstrated that the Base Prep Coordinator will require at least four or five assistants to carry out the assigned duties. The individuals must begin immediately to identify and list (Microsoft Access (dBase) format preferred) all building and area coordinators and points of contact who will be instrumental in the preparation/inspection process (Tab D, Base Preparations).

(e) Base Escort Coordinator

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB E

The Base Escort Coordinator is an individual designated to coordinate the training of Base Escort Teams in the basic fundamentals of interaction with the United States Government (USG) Escort Team. In charge of all base escorts, this individual should select 10 to 20 facility personnel, E-7 or above, or civilian equivalent if possible, from which the necessary number of escorts will be selected. Selection shall be based on their ability to react under pressure and think on their feet and on how essential they are to their normal jobs. (These individuals may be the command's on-scene representatives during the inspection.)

(f) Administrative Officer

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB L

The Administration Officer is in charge of supplying clerical and other administrative personnel for word processing/general support in the Inspection Ops Center and elsewhere, as needed. The Admin Officer will work closely with the Inspection Ops Center Coordinator and the Tiger Team's Documentation Specialist when they arrive. Their checklist is combined with Supply and Transportation in TAB L.

NOTES

(g) Supply Officer

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB L

The Supply Officer is in charge of supplying the Inspection Ops Center with tables, chairs, copiers, fax machines, desk top computers, administrative supplies, etc. as well as other items as may be needed for the inspection effort. Your facility should plan on providing at least one junior supply person on a 24-hour basis until the Inspection Ops Center setup is complete. The Supply Officer checklist is combined with Admin and Transportation in TAB L

(h) Public Affairs Officer (PAO)

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB M

The PAO will coordinate information to be released to the press on behalf of the command. Obtain the concurrence of the appropriate PAO as designated by the theater CINC prior to release, as well as any other signatures required normally as part of your chain of command. The Public Affairs Officer needs to quickly prepare a public affairs plan. Informing facility personnel and the general public about the inspection can be beneficial, but should be well thought out, carefully timed, and appropriately worded.

(i) Safety Officer

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB J

The individual assigned must be able to deliver the necessary safety briefings and head all safety functions for visitors, IIT members, and Department of the Navy (DON) personnel throughout the duration of the inspection. The Safety Officer will receive their orders from the CO, since the CO will retain overall responsibility for the safety of the facility, its operations, and that of the inspection and escort teams.

(j) Legal Officer

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB N

The designated staff JAG or Legal Officer is responsible for legal planning and advice to the CO during the inspection. A few of the many issues the assigned individual should already be familiar with are the legal issues involved in CWC Treaty implementation, including your Host Country Agreement; local and

NOTES

national laws; diplomatic privileges and immunity; liability for facility related injuries, emergency medical care; and many of the usual issues related to access requirements and contract law. (TAB N is the Legal checklist)

(k) Medical/Dental Officer

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB O.....

Emergency medical care provided by on-site medical staff, if available, or coordination of ambulance transportation, in advance, to a local medical facility are only a few of the many services required by the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty. (Details are contained in TAB O).

(l) Counterintelligence Officer

Provided the assigned individual with a copy of TAB I

The Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) should assign a Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) to provide counterintelligence support during the course of the inspection. Criminal investigative responsibilities will not be affected by this event.

(m) Transportation Officer

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB L

Vehicular needs (buses with drivers), designated parking, and personnel assignments for maintenance points (fuel), vehicles for VIP visitors and escorts, are only a few of the areas requiring the assistance of a Transportation Officer (TAB L).

(n) Physical Security Coordinator

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB G.....

The Physical Security Coordinator will have an active role throughout all six phases the inspection, ensuring the physical protection (security) of the International Inspection Team (IIT), crowd control, and badging of personnel. The Physical Security Coordinator will be responsible for liaison with local law enforcement, establishing a badging system (see Base Prep Coordinator functions, TAB D), and assisting in the implementation of the site self-monitoring plan (see

NOTES

Self-Monitoring Coordinator, TAB F). Their assignment usually comes through the Safety Officer (see TAB J).

(o) Operations Security (OPSEC) Officer

Provide the assigned individual with a copy of TAB H.....

The OPSEC Officer is responsible for ensuring that essential secrecy is maintained by performing proactive OPSEC surveys and using the OPSEC methodology to mitigate possible hostile collection efforts from anyone involved at your facility throughout the course of the inspection.

6. Direct the setup of the Inspection Ops Center

Proper planning and preparation for an inspection begins with the setup of the Inspection Ops Center. Direct the Inspection Ops Center Coordinator and the Communications Officer to review Inspection Ops Center (Tab C) in the IRP. They need to select the location of the Inspection Ops Center for CO's approval and immediately begin setting it up for the inspection. They will need supply and administrative support to set up the Inspection Ops Center quickly. Ensure that the Communications, Administration, and Supply Officers are working with the Inspection Ops Center Coordinator to set up the Inspection Ops Center in rapid order (Tab C, Inspection Ops Center). Also, direct the selection of locations for the IIT private work space, the observer's work space, the briefing area for the IIT, USG escorts' work area, Host Country escort waiting area, and the negotiations spaces while the inspection party is on site (Tab L, Supply, Transportation and Administration).

7. Review the Basic Plan

The Basic Plan section of the IRP provides a good overview of what is expected to occur during the course of a challenge inspection. It is recommended that it be thoroughly reviewed once Steps 1 through 4 of the CIO's Checklist are underway, before the initial planning meeting.

NOTES

8. Review Appendix S1, Inspection Negotiations

Appendix S1 provides a good description of the entire negotiation process that takes place during the course of a CWC challenge inspection and addresses the conduct of an initial vulnerability assessment. The CO or his designated representative should be directly involved with this aspect of the inspection from the start.

INITIAL INSPECTION PLANNING MEETING

9. Before the initial inspection-planning meeting complete the following:

- Provide, for CO's approval, the names of personnel designated to fill positions on the IPS.

- Schedule a time and place to have the initial inspection-planning meeting. The Inspection Ops Center is the preferred location, but do not delay the meeting unnecessarily while deciding on a location for the Inspection Ops Center.

- Notify all IPS designees to attend the initial inspection-planning meeting.

NOTES

Listed below is a proposed list of command staff members who should attend the initial inspection planning meeting:

- Executive Officer/Chief Staff Officer
- Department Heads
- Communications Officer
- Command Duty Officer(s)
- Supply Officer
- Medical Officer
- Legal Officer
- Public Affairs Officer
- Administrative Officer
- Public Works Officer
- Transportation Officer
- OPSEC Officer
- Counterintelligence Officer
- Contracting Officer
- Operations Officer (harbor, airfield, test ranges, etc.)
- Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Resident Agent
- Safety (Environmental, Hazardous Waste) Officer
- Security Officer (Provost Marshal)
- Sampling and Analysis Personnel
- Tenant activity representatives (examples):
 - Communications stations
 - Marine detachments
 - Marine ordnance test units
 - Explosive ordnance detachments, schools, etc.
- Other resident tenant agencies or other services (examples):
 - Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, detachments, etc., and private contractors.

NOTE:
It may be beneficial or even necessary to include Host Country representatives in some or all phases of your planning and execution. Ask your Legal Officer for advice.

NOTES

10. Distribute IRP tabs to IPS as follows:.....

Position	IRP Tabs	No. of Copies
Ops Center Coordinator	Tab C	1
Base Preparation Coordinator	Tab D	5
Base Escort Coordinator	Tab E	5
Self-Monitoring Coordinator	Tab F	2
Facility Security Officer	Tab G	5
OPSEC/CI Officer	Tab H	2
NCIS Resident Agent	Tab I	3
Safety Officer	Tab J	2
Communications Officer	Tab K	2
Administrative Officer	Tab L	1
Supply Officer	Tab L	2
Transportation Officer	Tab L	2
Public Affairs Officer	Tab M	1
Legal Officer	Tab N	1
Medical/Dental Officer	Tab O	2
Tenant Activities, Ships in Port	Basic Plan + Tab D w/Appendix + Tab E w/Appendix and Tab P	1

Remove, copy, and distribute relevant IRP tabs to IPS personnel. Each of the IPS positions, along with their respective IRP tabs and recommended number of copies, are listed in the table above. **NOTE: Discussion pages may be double-sided.**

Hand out copies of tabs from the IRP to responsible individuals before the initial inspection-planning meeting. Individuals should review and study required actions (see the Personnel section of the Basic Plan for a more detailed description of duties/responsibilities).

NOTES

CONDUCT OF INITIAL INSPECTION PLANNING MEETING

This meeting should be held as soon after notification as possible, but in no case later than 3 hours after notification. It is better to hold the meeting and determine the current state of affairs and availability of personnel and facilities than postpone starting in the hope of resolving all issues ahead of time. Ensure tenant activities and, possibly, Host Country representatives are invited to attend and are included in the preparation process.

11. Confirm that time-sensitive functions and activities are underway.....

Task an individual to ensure that all participants having time-sensitive functions are adequately supported to fulfill their duties. This includes self-monitoring, Inspection Ops Center setup, base preparations and their supporting activities (communications, supply, administration, physical security, transportation). (See checklist items below.)

12. Determine from the facility Self-Monitoring Coordinator the status of self-monitoring preparations

Self-monitoring operations must commence 12 hours after the International Inspection Team (IIT) arrives at the POE (Tab F, Self-Monitoring). Facilities with Host Country guard forces will have to coordinate the Self-Monitoring operation.

13. Determine from the Base Prep Coordinator the status of executing Tab D, Base Preparation

Begin immediately identifying and listing (dBase format, if possible) building and area coordinators and points of contact who will be instrumental in the preparation/inspection process. Ensure that all commands and tenants are included (Tab D, Base Preparations).

NOTES

14. Review Appendix S1, Inspection Negotiations

Direct the Self-Monitoring Coordinator to brief the requested perimeter to all IPS members in the Inspection Ops Center. Evaluate the requested perimeter and provide feedback to the appropriate theater office regarding concerns. It is important in the review of Appendix S1 that close attention is paid to the areas adjacent to either side of the requested perimeter. Private landowners on the facility within the perimeter must be identified as early in the negotiations as possible. Refer all questions to Naval Treaty Implementation Program for resolution/clarification.

15. Coordinate Naval Treaty Implementation Program requests

Throughout the inspection, but particularly early in the process, there will be a tremendous need for the exchange of facility information, diagrams, etc. It is recommended that an individual be assigned to assist in verifying maps and diagrams. Accurate maps and diagrams of the facility are crucial to the perimeter negotiations that will occur before the inspection team's arrival at the facility.

16. Direct Safety Officer to assess safety hazards

Safety Officer should review ongoing or scheduled operations from a safety perspective. Provide an assessment of safety hazards and related hazardous operations that may need to be curtailed or avoided during the inspection (Tab J, Safety). Ensure that all safety-related concerns are identified and determine what special safety-related equipment will be needed. Relay special safety information to Naval Treaty Implementation Program (Tab J, Safety and Tab L, Supply, Transportation and Administration).

17. Assess the impact of the inspection on operations

Request Operations Officers (airfield, harbor, test, or firing ranges, etc.) to assess impact of inspection on operations (to include personnel issues such as personnel augmentation and overtime) and safety.

NOTES

NOTE: Activities with air stations should consider limiting incoming *transient* aircraft to OFFICIAL BUSINESS ONLY after being notified of a Challenge Inspection. Review your planned operations and Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) procedures. Likewise, if your activity has pier facilities, harbor operations, or anchorage, you should review local operational area procedures, operations, and Notice to Mariners as appropriate.

All these areas are subject to self-monitoring.

18. Determine facility sensitivities

Coordinate with facility Physical Security Coordinator to assess facility physical and operational vulnerabilities to a CWC inspection (Tab G, Physical Security).

Request OPSEC Officer to support the Base Prep Coordinator by determining sensitive areas, buildings, and sections within buildings that will need special protection during a CWC challenge inspection (Tab H, Operations Security).

19. Request the PAO develop a public affairs plan
(Tab M, Public Affairs)

PREPARATION ACTIVITIES

20. Prepare for arrival of inspection participants

Coordinate with Naval Treaty Implementation Program to ascertain the number of inspectors, Tiger Team members, other USG officials traveling to the facility, and their expected arrival times. The facility must plan for meals, negotiation and work rooms, and other logistical needs (Tab L, Supply, Transportation and Administration).

NOTE: Inform facility personnel in the welcoming party that their demeanor will set the tone for the inspection, and that they should assume a professional and cordial manner toward the IIT.

NOTES

- 21. Obtain copies of a detailed facility map
(These maps are NOT to be given to the IIT until approved)**

Assigned individual should coordinate with the Naval Treaty Implementation Program (NTIP) Tiger Team Treaty Information Management System (TIMS) expert to insure that our existing TIMS facility maps are current. Include available local area maps. The Tiger Team will review these maps for further distribution.

- 22. Ensure progress is underway with respect to treaty-required actions.....**

Refer to the timeline to establish your position with respect to treaty-required actions such as self-monitoring, arrival of IIT, attendance at POE negotiations, etc.

- 23. Coordinate Tiger Team planning meeting.....**

Schedule the time, location, and the list of personnel who should attend. The Tiger Team planning meeting should be held as soon as possible after the arrival of the Tiger Team.

Time: _____ **Place:** _____

- 24. Develop pre-inspection briefing.....**

The Tiger Team Leader will provide additional guidance in briefing development (review Appendix S2, Pre-Inspection Briefings). It is critical that appropriate personnel are tasked with preparing this brief as soon as possible.

- 25. Ensure facility site diagram is cleared for release to the IIT**

Review Appendix S2, Pre-Inspection Briefings

- 26. Determine a geographic reference point (GRP) to recommend to the IIT**

The facility should be prepared to assist the IIT in verifying the location of the perimeter through the use of IIT location-identifying equipment [portable global positioning system (GPS)] and with reference to local landmarks on maps. The NTIP Tiger Team will also bring a backup GPS system.

NOTES

TIGER TEAM PLANNING MEETING (Steps 27 to 29)

27. Meet with Tiger Team Leader upon arrival.....

Discuss overview of inspection process, essential initial preparation efforts and status of facility's preparation steps. Coordinate with the Tiger Team Leader to integrate inspection support equipment into facility planning efforts.

28. Conduct Tiger Team planning meeting.....

Introduce key IPS personnel to Tiger Team and vice versa. Discuss immediate issues/problems or any potential delays with meeting treaty-required items. Tiger Team personnel come prepared to contribute their experience and technical expertise where needed.

(a) Determine present position on inspection timeline (Figure A-1)

(b) Tiger Team Leader will:

- Brief the inspection mandate, if available.
- Present the inspection timeline. Ensure all participants understand the timeline and its significance in meeting crucial treaty-required events.

(c) Tiger Team member brief the TIMS resources brought to support the inspection preparation process

(d) Self-Monitoring Coordinator reports on the following items:.....

- Location of all perimeter exits, and those that are subject to monitoring
- Positioning of locks and seals on exits that will not be used
- Coordination with facility security personnel who will conduct self-monitoring
- Status of self-monitoring preparations, including training and equipment checkouts.

NOTES

(e) CIO reports on the following items:.....

- IIT arrival schedule/itinerary/transportation/lodging/etc.
- If a facility orientation tour for the IIT and USG Escorts is proposed and accepted by the inspection team, begin planning a route and designate a qualified driver and a spokesperson for the tour. The Tiger Team Leader or his deputy, the DON Treaty Expert, and a Tiger Team Security Specialist will provide assistance with route planning and narration.
- Status of pre-inspection briefing: Does the CIO have the mandate?

(f) Inspection Ops Center Coordinator reports on the following:.....

- Room selected for Inspection Operations Center: Is it adequate to the task as outlined in Tab C of the IRP?
- Installation of communications: Have telephone lines and radio net been installed as required in Tab C? Is the Communications Officer supervising on-scene?
- Other Inspection Operation Center support: Are the administration, supply, transportation, and other appropriate functions adequately supporting setup of the Inspection Operations Center?
- Facilities selected for IIT work/rest area; USG escort work area; briefing and negotiation areas; base escort holding area. Included in this discussion should be the arrangements made to support the ECBFAC's Sampling and Analysis Team requirements (see Appendix S5).

(g) Communications Officer should report on the following:

- Progress of communications planning: Is there a manning schedule for the Inspection Ops Center radio operators? Is there a communications plan in place?
- Setup of the Inspection Ops Center: Are there any problems with installing telephone lines or setting up a radio net?

NOTES

(h) Base Preparation Coordinator reports on the following:.....

- Base preparation: Is the list of building and area coordinators being developed? Are site prep assistants being selected? Is Tab D of the IRP being implemented?
- Are the OPSEC officer, the NCIS representative and other security personnel responding to the Base Prep Coordinator as required?

(i) Base Escort Coordinator reports on the following:

- Status of base escort training
- Are arrangements for receiving the IIT at the airport in place, if required?
- Have anticipated transportation and communication arrangements been implemented?

(j) Other IPS members report on their progress as appropriate:

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| • Supply Officer | <input type="checkbox"/> | • Public Works Officer | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| • Physical Security Officer | <input type="checkbox"/> | • Medical / Dental Officer..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| • Safety Officer | <input type="checkbox"/> | • Public Affairs Officer..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| • Legal Officer | <input type="checkbox"/> | • Administration Officer | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| • Transportation Officer | <input type="checkbox"/> | • Tenant Activities | <input type="checkbox"/> |

29. Coordinate Phase 1-2 Transition Meeting.....

Time: _____ **Place:** _____

Personnel who should attend Phase 1-2 transition meeting: Self-monitoring Coordinator, Base Escort Coordinator, Inspection Ops Center Coordinator, and Host Country Representatives, if required.

NOTES

30. Preparation of threat briefing.....

Task the local NCIS agent to prepare a threat briefing that should include date from the country(s) of origin of the international inspectors. Limit attendance to the CO/CIO, Tiger Team Leader, and Security Representative.

31. Draft the Public Affairs memo.....

Coordinate with the PAO in drafting a memo notifying all facility personnel of the impending inspection. Ensure that the memo is appropriate for both local and national release.

32. Development of alternative means using managed access procedures.....

Alternative means for demonstrating compliance should be devised for areas deemed restricted for safety or security reasons (Appendix S1, Inspection Negotiations).

Phase 2 — Initial Preparation



PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 PHASE 5 PHASE 6

Phase 2 is the time period from the start of self-monitoring (which is NLT 12 hours after the IIT arrives at the POE) to the arrival of the IIT at the facility (which must occur by 36 hours after arrival of the IIT at the POE).

PHASE 1-2 TRANSITION MEETING

To be held in the CWC Inspection Ops Center no later than IIT arrival at POE plus 10 hours.

Self-monitoring must begin within 2 hours.

33. Attend Phase 1-2 transition meeting.....

Report on the following items: (1) plans for self-monitoring, which must begin NLT 12 hours after IIT arrives at POE; and (2) plans for IIT and USG Escort Team arrival.

NOTES

34. Assess the inspection timeline

Coordinate and update the inspection timeline during the Phase 1-2 transition meeting.

35. Review status of pre-inspection briefing.....

Raise any concerns or issues about content, format, briefer, etc.

36. Coordinate facility pre-arrival meeting

Time: _____ **Place:** _____

All IPS assigned personnel should attend the facility pre-arrival meeting.

37. Receive NCIS threat briefing

Receive the threat briefing conducted by the NCIS noting the inspectors' country of origin. Briefing should be limited to the CO/CIO, Tiger Team Leader, and Security Representative.

38. Brief Inspection Ops Center personnel.....

As required, inform Inspection Ops Center personnel of the current status of negotiations, site preparation, self-monitoring, receipt of final perimeter, etc.

39. Conduct inspection impact assessments

Make recommendations to the CO regarding all aspects of inspection impact on the command including recommendations on requirements for personnel augmentation or overtime, and the potential need to suspend certain facility activities or operations.

NOTES

40. Determine facility sampling backup requirements

The International Inspectors have the right to take swipes, water, air, soil, or effluent samples in a 50 meter band outward from the established edge of the perimeter (Note: The IIT does NOT have the same rights to take samples INSIDE the perimeter. They must first negotiate if, when, where, and what their sampling requirements are before they are allowed to take samples inside the perimeter).

For its own records and analysis, your facility should plan to take duplicate backup samples of whatever the IIT samples (see Appendix S5, Sampling). The 50-meter band may extend outside of the installation on private or Host Country property, and will have to be closely coordinated with or controlled by the Host Country officials.

41. Ensure training schedules for base escorts and base preparation

Verify with respective coordinators that team training schedules are established and have been promulgated (Tab D, Base Preparations and Tab E, Base Escorts).

42. Review IIT arrival sequence of events

Include expected perimeter activities and have appropriate IPS personnel present (Supply, Transportation, Public Affairs, Inspection Ops Center, etc.).

43. Coordinate contracting issues

As directed by the CO, meet with Finance and Contracts Officer to discuss any CWC challenge inspection related contracting issues.

44. Prepare for the turnover of self-monitoring to the IIT (exit monitoring)

See Tab F, Self-Monitoring, for instructions.

45. Logging requirements

Ensure Inspection Operations Center Coordinator and his communicator are prepared to track and log which escorts and inspectors are in each of the subgroups. Verify that subgroup call signs have been established and are displayed on a wall chart.

NOTES

FACILITY PRE-ARRIVAL MEETING (Steps 46 – 53)

46. Attend facility pre-arrival meeting

This is the last status meeting before the arrival of the IIT at the facility. The following personnel should provide reports on the status of their activities:

- CIO.....
- Ops Center Coordinator
- Base Prep Coordinator
- Transportation Officer
- Base Escort Coordinator
- Physical Security Officer
- Safety Officer.....
- Legal Officer
- Host Country Representative
- Public Works Officer.....
- Medical/Dental Officer.....
- Public Affairs Officer.....
- Supply Officer
- Administration Officer
- Communications Officer
- Resident NCIS Agent
- Tenant Activities

47. Review self-monitoring transition planning.....

Verify that support for the perimeter activity plan is in place. Check to ensure the issue of access to buildings on the perimeter has been addressed if it applies to your situation. Finally, is there a need to provide for special transportation (4WD, boat, helicopter, etc.) on perimeter?

48. Review facility sampling policy.....

The treaty explicitly grants the IIT the right to take air, soil, and effluent samples within a 50-meter band outside the alternative/final perimeter using prescribed equipment to document such facts that are related to possible CWC compliance/noncompliance. Additionally, the treaty specifically allows the IIT the right to *request* samples inside the perimeter (Appendix S5, Sampling). Discuss the differences between your facility sampling policy and the Treaty requirements.

NOTES

49. Confirm that area and building POCs for all buildings and areas have been identified and that training is in progress

50. Confirm that escorts have been identified and trained, particularly for perimeter activities

51. Review logistics support plan for the IIT

Confirm that arrangements are complete and that personnel have been assigned to meet, greet, and escort the IIT as well as other VIPs at the arrival point.

52. Review pre-inspection briefings

Include the Tiger Team in the review process. Check that no inappropriate information is presented.

53. Arrange for USG strategy meeting

This meeting should take place following the IIT pre-inspection briefing and include the Tiger Team Leader, appropriate facility representatives, and USG Host Team.

54. Support planning for IIT perimeter activities

Assist with verification of geographic reference point (GRP). Ensure base escorts and transportation are prepared to escort the IIT to the GRP for verification of location and to the perimeter for perimeter activities.

Support the USG Host Team during perimeter/inspection plan negotiations and perimeter activities.

Ensure that preparations for escorts and transportation of the IIT during perimeter activities are ready for implementation.

NOTES

55. Review Appendixes S3 and S4.....

Make preparations to handle requests for information and request to conduct personnel interviews. Ensure the Security Officer gets a copy of Appendix S4 and is ready to support any IIT requests for personnel interviews.

Phase 3 — Perimeter Negotiation/Final Preparations



Phase 3 is the time period from IIT arrival at the base to the crossing of the final perimeter by the IIT. Crossing of the perimeter can be as much as 72 hours after the IIT arrives at the facility.

56. A quick, informal meeting with the USG Escort Team Leader, Tiger Team Leader and facility CO should be held before the pre-inspection briefing

This short meeting should provide an opportunity for the USG Escort Team Leader to pass any information to the facility prior to the start of the pre-inspection briefings and vice versa.

57. Participate in pre-inspection briefing of IIT upon their arrival.....

The CO's welcome briefing is the official welcome (roughly 5 minutes in length) to the IIT, their USG escorts, and the USG Host Team. This also provides an opportunity to introduce other members of the IPS who will present portions of the briefing and will have contact on a routine basis with the inspection team (i.e., Safety Officer, Escort Coordinator, etc.).

If the IIT has traveled straight from the POE to the facility, an offer to allow them to stop at their quarters before delivery of the remainder of the pre-inspection briefing should be extended.

The atmosphere during the briefing should be professional and cordial. A concerted effort should be made to ensure interaction with the IIT is non-confrontational.

NOTES

58. Update site diagrams as required

Have the Base Preparation Coordinator and the Self-Monitoring Coordinator review site diagrams showing the current inspection boundary. Brief IPS on the inspection boundary. Provide the most recent version that has been cleared for release to IIT.

59. Ensure transition of self-monitoring functions to IIT, or termination, as appropriate.....

60. Host a USG strategy meeting immediately following the pre-inspection briefing with Base Escort Coordinator/National Authority representative/ USG Escort Team Leader and Tiger Team representatives

The purpose of this meeting is to establish ground rules as to how the inspection plan will be implemented in the field. It is important that all members of the Escort Team understand their role and limits of authority during the course of the inspection.

61. Ensure that base preparations are fully underway

The preparation efforts should reflect agreements made in the inspection plan negotiations.

62. Support IIT perimeter activities.....

63. Support inspection plan negotiations

Inspection plan negotiations will occur on site and could involve the following parties: Host Team Representative, CO or his designated representative, USG Escort Team Leader, IIT Leader, Tiger Team Leader, and DON Treaty Expert. If it is agreed to beforehand and room permitting, it would be beneficial to the facility preparation efforts to have a base prep representative sit in on the negotiation sessions.

NOTES

64. Brief IPS after each negotiation session

Personnel manning the Inspection Operations Center must be kept informed of all developments resulting from the negotiations. It is critical that some satisfactory method (i.e., phone, and note-taker) be established before the start of negotiations and utilized throughout the process. Confer with the Tiger Team Leader and National Authority or USG representative (if one is present) for further guidance.

65. Conduct the post-negotiation facility meeting.....

Review status of facility inspection preparations, results of negotiations, and status of proposed sampling. Review arrangements for the facility tour, if required. Focus on facility's readiness to conduct inspection.

66. Brief IPS on final perimeter

Before the IIT commences inspection activities, brief the Base Escort Coordinator, base escorts, and USG escorts regarding the final perimeter and the negotiated inspection plan.

Phase 4 — Inspection Activities



Phase 4 is the time period from the IIT crossing of the final perimeter to the conclusion of the inspection by the IIT. Phase 4 can last up to 84 hours.

Do not, under any circumstance, allow the IIT to initially cross any perimeter without first obtaining your CO's permission.

NOTES

67. Track inspection subgroup movements

Ensure that the Tiger Team computerized TIMS, the Communicator's sign-out boards, and the Communicator's logs reflect the movements of the inspection team subgroups and the base preparation teams during the inspection.

The IPS should be monitoring the TIMS, all radio calls, and the Communicator's log to follow the progress of the inspection. Be ready to respond and remain alert for the need for rapid decisions regarding questions or requests that come in from the field.

68. Work with tenant and Host Country activity/agencies who are involved in inspection activities

69. Monitor base preparations.....

The Base Preparation Coordinator should keep the CIO apprised of building preparation status, including ongoing operational activities and inspection plan execution.

70. Support daily inspection progress review

Solicit input from appropriate departments.

71. Assist the CO in keeping chain of command informed

Phase 5 — Post-Inspection Activities



PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 PHASE 5 PHASE 6

Phase 5 is the 24-hour period following the conclusion of IIT inspection.

72. Coordinate facility after-action report

NOTES

- 73. Provide IIT administrative support.....

- 74. Provide command support for resolving ambiguities or compliance issues that surface during the inspection period.....

- 75. View the report of IIT preliminary findings.....

- 76. Provide logistics support.....

As needed, provide transportation for the IIT to the airport.

Phase 6 — Post-Inspection Recovery



Phase 6 commences upon IIT departure. Phase 6 includes a complete post-inspection recovery and cleanup, continuing until the facility is fully restored to normal operating conditions.

- 77. Conduct after-action reviews.....
Coordinate with the OPSEC officer and the NCIS agent to assist in personnel debriefs.

- 78. Complete facility after-action report

- 79. With CO's permission, return to normal facility operations

- 80. As necessary, develop a facility remedial action plan and track all corrective actions taken

NOTES

Appendix S1

INSPECTION NEGOTIATIONS

Appendix S1 provides guidance to the facility Commanding Officer (CO), facility Challenge Inspection Officer (CIO), and facility Operations Security (OPSEC) Officer, concerning the conduct of an initial vulnerability assessment, the development of the alternative perimeter, the perimeter negotiation process, and the inspection plan negotiation process.

RESPONSIBILITIES

The CO, assisted by the CIO and Tiger Team Leader, and in coordination with the theater CINC Staff, the Naval component staff, the Naval Treaty Implementation Program and the United States Government (USG) Host Team, is responsible for the facility negotiating positions.

BACKGROUND

Three key components of a challenge inspection are negotiable: the inspection perimeter; the inspection plan; and questions of access to certain facilities or areas that arise during the inspection.

The following section provides information concerning the negotiations between the International Inspection Team (IIT) and the USG Host Team. A list of general questions (Table S-1) is provided to assist the facility in conducting its initial vulnerability assessment.

SCOPE

Facility Vulnerability Assessment Questions

Upon arrival at the POE, the IIT will present, along with the Inspection Mandate, a “requested” perimeter to help describe the area that they wish to inspect. The “final” perimeter is then negotiated. Who will conduct these negotiations and the framework for providing input during an inspection of a DON facility inside a Host Country will depend on a variety of factors. The three most important factors are: (1) Who is the inspected State? (i.e., did the OPCW challenge the United States Government or the Host Country?); (2) What are the Host Country preferences? and, (3) What are the CINC preferences? Hopefully, a Host Country Agreement (HCA) has been concluded prior to any possible challenge inspection. The HCA will specify the mechanisms of participation and input.

Regardless of the specific methods, it is extremely important for the facility to identify any unique sensitivity, such as proprietary information, operations, or classified programs and technologies that require special consideration. The Naval Treaty Implementation Program (SP-2025) Treaty Operations Center (TOC)(unclassified phone 202-764-0920, classified STU-III 202-764-0926) and the Tiger Team are prepared to help answer questions and respond to concerns regarding this information. In particular, *your command should discuss with the TOC any areas where access to the inspectors must be denied.* Your command’s vulnerability assessments should be the driving force behind the development of the final perimeter. Identification of sensitivities should be coordinated with the OPSEC Officer and the local Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) agent to ensure they are fully apprised as early as possible prior to the impending inspection.

Answering the following questions in Table S-1 will complete the initial assessment of your facility. These questions are provided as a guide only to assist you in understanding where resources need to be focused in preparing for the challenge inspection.

Table S1-1 Facility Assessment Considerations

• What has to be protected?	
• Where is access difficult?	
• Does the requested perimeter cut through buildings or security enclosures?	
• Are there any ships in port or anticipated? Are there any sailings?	
• Are there aircraft present, anticipated arrivals or departures, or operational schedules affected by the inspection?	
• Do you have planned or ongoing exercises or evolutions?	
• Are there any emergency situations?	
• Are there ongoing industrial or R&D procedures or processes?	
• Do you have any foreign visitors present or anticipated?	
• Are any of your key personnel absent?	
• Are living quarters available for the International Inspection Team (IIT) and USG escorts? Are they close to your facility? (The Host Team/ Host Country usually arranges the off base berthing for the IIT. Your role is one of coordination).	
• Do you have any information to provide to the Naval Treaty Implementation Program (TOC) on the history of chemical weapons activity (including storage of riot control agents) since 1945 at your facility? Include production, R&D, and storage.	
• Do you have previous or current CW-capable weapons systems?	

• Are or were munitions ever stored at your facility?	
• Do you have anything that is likely to give a CW-type signature? Such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Industrial waste from chemical weapons or an industrial waste site of any kind ➤ Activities using any industrial chemicals ➤ Solid waste management units or hazardous material/waste storage areas. 	
• Are there private landowner properties, Indian lands, or endangered species areas on or near your facility that would impede or restrict access to any areas of your facility?	
• Are there areas of the facility's perimeter that are difficult to access: surrounded by water, difficult terrain, long distances?	
• Is there any sensitive Host Country concern?	

NOTE: The Answers to these and any other assessment concerns must be relayed to the NTIP TOC prior to arrival of IIT at the POE. IIT arrival time will be defined in the initial notification message transmitted to your facility. Monitor your message traffic. Call the TOC (202-764-0920) with the results of your assessment immediately upon completion. Classified STU-III phone lines are available if necessary.

Inspection Perimeter

The inspection perimeter defines the area within which inspectors want to inspect, and the 50-meter border outside which inspectors are allowed to conduct monitoring activities. Thus, the placement of the perimeter governs where intrusive inspection and sampling measures can take place, and has a critical impact on possible classified/sensitive facility information loss during the inspection.

The perimeter requested by the IIT must:

- Run a reasonable distance outside any structure on the site
- Not cut through any existing security enclosures
- Run a reasonable distance outside any existing security enclosures.

Upon arrival at the POE, the IIT will request the perimeter within which they want to inspect. They will present this "requested perimeter" to either the Host Country or United States Government (USG) negotiators, who will pass it to the TOC. It is at this point in the process that the inspected facility concerns must be made known, to include: "fidelity of the line" issues; private landowners within the confines of the requested perimeter; areas of sensitivity and any other perimeter-related issues that the CO feels are relevant. The negotiators, in forming a negotiating position based on recommendations provided by the facility, have the right to present an "alternative perimeter," which, according to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), can only be larger than the requested perimeter. However, the Navy and the negotiators may find it advantageous to present a larger "alternative perimeter" because the boundaries may be more convenient to define, to monitor, to guard, or to traverse than the requested perimeter. The USG and the IIT will negotiate the mutual acceptance of a "final" perimeter at the time the IIT first arrives at the POE. If the inspection perimeter cannot be agreed upon during negotiations at the POE, perimeter negotiations will continue at your site. Your Command input is both vital and urgently required to properly complete these negotiations.

For a variety of reasons, including the degree of accuracy of the map used by the IIT, the age of the maps, and for many other factors, the IIT's requested perimeter:

- May fail to run a reasonable distance outside some of the structures on your site
- May cut through the middle of existing security enclosures
- May fail to run a reasonable distance outside existing security enclosures
- May be required to be modified for one reason or another; therefore:

Changes to the IIT's requested perimeter may be required. The country being inspected must present its alternative perimeter to the IIT no later than 24 hours after the arrival of the IIT at the POE

The NTIP Tiger Team uses a computerized Treaty Information Management System (TIMS) to superimpose the requested perimeter diagram on detailed DON site diagrams in order to facilitate the development of an alternative perimeter (Appendix C3, Treaty Information Management System [TIMS]).

The proposed alternative perimeter must contain the entire requested perimeter and should combine two of the following conditions:

- **Not significantly extend the original requested enclosed area**
- **Run a short uniform distance from the requested perimeter**
- **Allow viewing of at least parts of the requested perimeter.**

The Inspected State may therefore change the location of sampling and exit monitoring activities, but may not exclude a building from inspection by proposing an inward shift of the perimeter. The alternative perimeter should also, as much as possible:

- **Run at least 10 meters outside any buildings or other structures**
- **Not cut through existing security enclosures**
- **Run at least 10 meters outside any existing security enclosures that the requesting State Party intends to include within the requested perimeter.**

The alternative perimeter should, as a rule, bear a close relationship to the requested perimeter, and take into account natural terrain features and manmade boundaries. It should normally run close to the surrounding security barrier if such a barrier exists.

Several factors should be considered when selecting an alternative perimeter. The primary goals of proposing an alternative perimeter are to facilitate the inspection and/or to protect classified information. The alternative perimeter should be selected so that it does not unreasonably burden either the site or the IIT. When the IIT-requested perimeter has only been roughly specified, an alternative perimeter could be constructed to conform to existing roads, fence lines, waterways, and walkways to protect facility equities and facilitate the conduct of inspection operations.

If, to protect sensitive or proprietary information, it is necessary to restrict visual observation by inspectors of certain structures within the facility during inspection operations at the perimeter, an alternative perimeter a greater distance from the structures than the requested perimeter can be proposed. It should be noted that, to the extent that a perimeter is moved "away" from certain structures, the geographic size of the area within the perimeter and area subject to inspection operations as a whole would increase. Because the CWC Treaty does not permit the exclusion of buildings within the requested perimeter from the alternative perimeter, the U.S. intends to exercise the right of "managed access" to the inside of the most sensitive buildings or structures.

Finally, if it is intended that an alternative perimeter encompass areas outside a facility's property, the CO should give full consideration to the ownership of adjacent property by others. This is especially important for facilities located in a Host Country and will require close coordination with the Host Country officials.

If agreement on an inspection perimeter is not reached while the IIT is at the POE, negotiations will continue when the IIT arrives at the facility. IIT arrival at the facility (i.e., alternative perimeter) signals the start of Phase 3. Refinements to the USG position may be made during this period on the basis of consultations between the USG Host Team and the facility CO. If agreement is not reached between the IIT and the USG Host Team by the end of Phase 3, the alternative perimeter becomes the final perimeter. To facilitate the perimeter negotiation process, the requested and alternative perimeter should be displayed in the CWC Inspection Ops center as they evolve.

Extent of Access

The CWC, in general, provides inspectors the right of access to all buildings and locations within the final inspection perimeter. Once the final inspection perimeter has been agreed, negotiations focus on the IIT's inspection plans. To protect sensitive, classified, and proprietary information while satisfying compliance concerns of the IIT, the USG will use managed access provisions for buildings and areas included in the inspection plan.

The CWC specifies that the IIT will conduct the inspection *in the least intrusive manner possible*. Wherever possible, it shall begin with the least intrusive procedures it deems acceptable and proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary.

Managed access is in fact used throughout the inspection process. Through the use of escorts, timing, point control, shrouding, etc., the facility is always "managing the access" of the inspection team. The treaty outlines some specific types of managed access such as:

- Removing sensitive papers from view
- Shrouding sensitive displays, stores, equipment, computers, or electronic systems
- Logging off of computer systems and turning off data indicating devices
- Securing certain facility operations
- Releasing selected personnel to liberty status
- Random Selective Access: involves requesting that the IIT select a percentage or number

of buildings and/or rooms within buildings from which it will randomly select areas for inspection.

- **Exceptional Access:** involves selecting specific individuals or subgroups of the IIT and granting only these individuals access to certain inspection areas.¹

In addition, the treaty allows the IIT to request aerial access. It may not be in the best interests of the Navy to accede to the IIT request for an overflight, since overflight may generate more questions than it answers, and may make the preparation process more difficult.

If the USG chooses to provide less than full access to places, activities, or information, it is under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to alleviate the possible compliance concern. Alternative means involves the use of evidence that will satisfy the IIT concern without providing full disclosure of the item in question. Such evidence could include photographs, blueprints, viewing a building or room through windows, an entrance, or by remote means, or the partial lifting of a shroud to refute a specific allegation.

Inspection Plan

The inspection plan governs the elements of intrusiveness of the inspection within the final perimeter. After the pre-inspection briefing, the IIT will prepare an initial inspection plan that specifies the activities to be carried out by the IIT, including the specific areas of the site to which access is desired. This plan may also include the sequence in which the areas will be visited, and the plans for requested sampling, interviews, and record review. The CWC agreement is unclear over exactly when the initial inspection plan is given to the inspected State Party: the inspected State Party should prompt the IIT for a plan if it is not forthcoming.

The IIT is obliged to take into consideration suggested modifications to the inspection plan made by the USG Host Team, at any stage of the inspection, including during the pre-inspection briefing, to ensure that sensitive equipment, information or areas not related to chemical weapons, are protected.

The development of the inspection plan thus amounts to negotiating parameters concerning conduct of the inspection. The negotiations between the IIT and the USG Host Teams can include:

- Extent of access to any particular places within the final perimeter
- Sequence of access to those places

¹ Neither Random Selective Access nor Exceptional Access should be primary methods of managed access.

- Particular inspection activities, including sampling, to be conducted by the IIT
- Performance of particular activities by the USG Escort Team and facility personnel involved in the inspection
- Provision of particular information by the facility.

Appendix S2

PRE-INSPECTION BRIEFINGS

Appendix S2 provides guidance on the preparation of the treaty-required pre-inspection briefing. Upon arrival, the Tiger Team Leader can provide further guidance in this area.

RESPONSIBILITIES

The Challenge Inspection Officer (CIO) is responsible for the planning, coordination, and presentation of pre-inspection briefings.

BACKGROUND

The CIO should direct the formulation and delivery of the pre-inspection briefing and post-negotiation briefing/conference. Briefings will be required to be given to both the United States Government (USG) representatives and to the International Inspection Team (IIT). The atmosphere during the briefing should be professional and cordial. A concerted effort should be made to ensure the interaction with the IIT is nonconfrontational. The briefing will be delivered upon arrival of the IIT at the facility. This pre-inspection briefing is required by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Treaty and *must last no more than 3 hours*. It should include a map (coordinated with the Tiger Team TIMS), and other documentation as appropriate, that illustrate all structures and significant geographic features. The briefing should include the following:

- Physical layout of the facility
- Clear presentation of the requested, alternative or final perimeters, as appropriate
- Description of basic activities carried out at the facility
- Safety measures required on the facility
- Administrative and logistic arrangements necessary for the inspection.

The briefing *may* also indicate the equipment, documentation, or areas the USG considers sensitive or not related to the mandate of the challenge inspection. Since the IIT will not have been granted access to your facility at this time, this briefing must be held outside the perimeter (and may actually be off base). This outside location may also serve as the conference room for perimeter/inspection plan negotiations.

At the conclusion of the pre-inspection briefing, the CIO should be prepared to meet with the USG team and escorts to discuss issues affecting the USG perimeter/inspection plan negotiation position.

Preparation for the briefings must be a high priority during Phases 1 and 2. The IIT is permitted to conduct perimeter activities upon arrival at the alternative perimeter. While it is strongly recommended that the IIT receive the pre-inspection briefing before conducting perimeter activities, the IIT has the right to initiate exit monitoring before this briefing.

Pre-Inspection Briefings

The pre-inspection briefing should include the following topics (listed in recommended order with recommended time allocations for each briefing):

- ***Official Welcome. 5 minutes.*** Welcoming remarks made by the Commanding Officer (CO) to the IIT and their USG escorts, and the USG Host Team. Provides opportunity for introductions between base escort personnel, the IIT, USG escorts and Host Team members. If the IIT has traveled straight from the point of entry (POE) to the facility, an offer to allow them to stop at their quarters before delivery of the remainder of the pre-inspection briefing should be extended.
- ***Facility Status Overview. 20 minutes.*** Presentation given by the CIO concerning the physical layout of the facility area, general activities at the facility, and factors with potential impact on the inspection (i.e., for safety reasons, the IIT cannot enter area or Building XX until YY testing/movement/process is completed). The briefing should include the status of facility self-monitoring activities. The facility should be prepared to discuss the availability of facility personnel and records, if requested by the IIT. This briefing should be coordinated with the Security Officer to minimize the sensitive information content. The site map and other required facility information will be provided to the USG Team Leader for distribution as appropriate. This briefing is treaty required.

- ***Safety Briefing. 25 minutes.*** Presentation of basic safety procedures that must be followed during the inspection, with brief instructions for actions to be taken in the event of an emergency. The briefing should focus on procedures required during activities within 50 meters of the site perimeter. This briefing is treaty required.
- ***Administrative and Logistics Briefing. 15 minutes.*** Presentation of the billeting, food, transportation, work area and other logistical arrangements for the IIT. This portion of the briefing may include a discussion of any security and badging/ID requirements, if appropriate. This briefing is treaty required.
- ***Question and Answer Period.*** Available time remaining in the pre-inspection briefing time period, hosted by the CIO and coordinated with the USG Host/Escort Team.

The CO and the CWC Inspection Planning Staff (IPS) should be prepared to conduct a *USG-only* meeting at the conclusion of the pre-inspection briefing with the USG Host Team and USG escorts in order to discuss the following information:

- ***Introductions.*** Introduce the members of the IPS.
- ***Facility Status.*** Current facility status and sensitivities that should be considered by the USG officials during negotiation of the perimeter and inspection plans, and during the conduct of the inspection.
- ***Perimeter Activities.*** Additional detail concerning the facility's handling of perimeter activities and self-monitoring beyond that delivered during the pre-inspection briefing.
- ***Sampling.*** Presentation of backup facility perimeter sampling plan, if appropriate.
- ***Access Procedures.*** Specific procedures for gaining access to buildings during the inspection.
- ***Support.*** Description of any special support the facility can provide.

BRIEFING OUTLINES

DETAILED BRIEFING TEMPLATES

The Tiger Team can provide templates in Power Point format upon arrival.
Template can also be transmitted in electronic format from the NTIP TOC.

PRE-INSPECTION BRIEFINGS

Official Welcome

- Introductions
- Briefing and rest schedule
- Compliance and safety goals

Facility Status Overview

- Facility layout and site map
- Facility activities
 - Present
 - Historical
- Activities impacting inspection
- Requested and alternative perimeters (and final if appropriate)
- Self-monitoring status and transition plan
- Information on facility personnel and record availability, if appropriate

Safety Briefings

- Facility Safety Officials

- Point of contact in Safety Office
- Fire/Emergency response resources

- Perimeter safety procedures
- General facility safety procedures
- Specific explosive or hazardous operations procedures or regulations
- Safety equipment to be provided (based on the inspection plan)
- Site unique safety considerations; i.e.,
 - Rattlesnakes, earthquakes, ticks
 - Ordnance impact area
 - Hazardous waste landfill(s)

- Do not touch any equipment or materials
- Escorts must lead the way
- Stay with the escorts

Administrative and Logistics Briefing

- Briefing and work rooms
- Restrooms
- Billeting
- Transportation
- Meals
- Special IIT requirements
- Work schedule
- Any other procedures with which the IIT must comply

DETAILED BRIEFING TEMPLATE

The Tiger Team will provide this template in Power Point format upon arrival. Template can also be transmitted in electronic format from SP2025.

NOTE: A proposed template of the pre-inspection briefing follows:

COMMAND PRE-INSPECTION BRIEFING — Presented by CO/XO/CIO

Welcome Aboard

- Introductory remarks
- Key players
- Briefing agenda

Key Players — Host Team

- Site Commander, XO, any distinguished guests
- IIT personnel
- USG escorts
- USG Host Team members
- Host Team POC/interlocutory

Briefing Agenda

- Facility status overview
- Safety and security
- Administrative and logistics
- Question and answer period

Facility Status Overview

- Mission statement
- Command history
- Command overview
- Physical layout
- Impact factors on inspection timeline
- Status of self-monitoring
- Site map and facility information

Mission Statement

Command History

- Chemical weapons (CW) specific
 - Past and present CW activities
 - Who, what, where, and when?
- Other ordnance programs

Command Overview

- Major departments
- Tenant activities
- Significant programs/projects
- Workforce structure
 - Contractors
 - Unions

Site Map

Physical Layout

- Identify major areas of interest
 - Piers and wharfs
 - Railroads
 - Heliports or airstrips
 - Medical facilities
 - CW related areas
- Note adjacent (perimeter) property over which site has no jurisdiction
- Any "process flow" that is applicable (use a block diagram)

Vehicle Exit Activity Status

- Status (may be provided at POE negotiations)
 - Start time
 - Vehicle exit activity locations
 - Provide rationale as necessary
 - Methods employed
- Recommendations for transition to exit monitoring (may be discussed at POE negotiations)
 - Secure ALL self-monitoring activities upon IIT arrival at the first self-monitoring location
 - Review all original tapes and logs collected during the self-monitoring activities. Duplicates/ copies can be made at the Navy Tiger Team Ops Center prior to turning the originals over to the Host Team for final transfer to IIT records.
 - Ready to support perimeter activities

Impact Factors

- Ships, planes, trains entering or leaving during the course of the inspection
- Operations that will limit access
- Anticipated weather over following week
- Other significant events that will compete for CO's or XO's time and attention
- Site-unique factors that will impact activities scheduled
 - Examples: Food not available, vehicle limitations, occupancy limits
- Response to mandate
- Overflight request
- Building preparation limitations
 - 6-hour planning factor
 - Include operational and logistics considerations
 - Revising a building may require re-prep
- Site diagram issues

Safety and Security Briefing

- Basic safety requirements
 - Issues related to perimeter activities within the 50-meter band
 - Any safety equipment by site/to be provided by site (leg stats, hardhats)
 - Any site requirements for additional screening (e.g., spiograph)
 - Any environmental hazards
 - Response to emergency situations

- Security requirements
 - Any required badging
 - Security areas of concern to inspectors
 - Any buildings with sign-in/sign-out requirements
 - Guard force posture
 - Do they carry weapons?
 - Any heightened security posture in place or expected
 - Any local threat to site/inspectors

Administrative Matters

- Working hours
- Work and storage spaces and keys (include restroom locations)
- Briefing/negotiating spaces (separate areas for IIT and Tiger Team)
- Communications support for Tiger Team/ Facility Escorts
- Transportation arrangements (Tiger Team/ Host Team/ IIT)
- Meal arrangements
- Proposal for daily meetings
- Requesting State Party observer arrangements
 - Work spaces
 - Communications
 - Access/activities
 - Participation (through Inspection Team Leader)

Questions and Answer Period

- Invite chief inspector to speak
- Adjourn

NOTES

Appendix S3

IIT INFORMATION REQUESTS

Appendix S3 provides guidance on receiving, tracking, and providing information to the International Inspection Team (IIT) in response to their requests for inspection-related information.

RESPONSIBILITIES

The Challenge Inspection Officer (CIO) has primary coordination responsibilities for tracking and providing information to the IIT in response to its requests. The Inspection Planning Staff (IPS) will assist as necessary.

BACKGROUND

A key U.S. objective in handling any Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) inspection is to obtain a favorable inspection report, which means that the compliance concerns in the challenge mandate were disproved and that there are no outstanding ambiguities. In addition to the obvious need to refute noncompliance allegations, achieving a favorable inspection report precludes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from justifying a return visit to the facility by an IIT with a potentially even more intrusive mandate.

Before passing any requested documents, completed forms etc. to IIT, ensure that all contract numbers are removed from the materials.

HANDLING IIT INFORMATION REQUESTS

All information requests from the IIT or the requesting State Party observer will fall into two broad categories:

- Those requests requiring time for research and/or coordination
- Those requests that can be immediately satisfied, if appropriate.

A request for a list of all facility personnel who have traveled to USA Dugway Proving Ground in the last 5 years is an example of the first type of request. On the other hand, a request by the inspectors to enter a bulk cargo storage yard that they have encountered is an example of the second type of request.

As early as possible (even at the point of entry [POE]), the United States Government (USG) team will attempt to elicit the information requirements of the IIT. The IIT should be reminded that the earlier such requests are made, the better the support the U.S. can provide.

The USG team should keep a ready listing of these requirements and their disposition. Should the information be provided and the IIT asks to see additional items, for example, the U.S. can use the list to show that it has already complied with the requirements of the IIT and that there is no justification to further IIT activity at the site. In addition, such a checklist, by documenting cooperation, can prove very helpful in case the IIT or the requesting State Party observer later make any unfounded accusations.

- Within the Inspection Ops Center, information requests should be directed to the CIO for review and assignment. Specific actions to issue a positive accounting for requests include:
 - Log the request in.
 - Analyze the request for applicability to the CWC and the mandate.
 - Assign components of the information request to the appropriate agencies.
 - Collect, collate, and organize the responses.
 - Have the material reviewed and approved for release by the Commanding Officer.
 - Provide the material to the USG team.
 - Log the action out.

Database Requests

- Types of requests may include:
 - Database requests
 - Individual personnel/health records
 - Technical reports or supply/financial records.

All request for these types of information should be routed to the Inspection Ops Center for resolution on a case-by-case basis with the CO. The Tiger Team has significant experience in dealing appropriately with this issue. Under *no* circumstance should classified or sensitive information be released without the appropriate level approval.

NOTES

Appendix S4

PERSONNEL INTERVIEWS

Appendix S4 discusses preparations for personnel interviews requested by the International Inspection Team (IIT).

RESPONSIBILITIES

The Security Officer/Provost Marshal, in coordination with the local Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) agent, Operations Security (OPSEC) Officer, United States Government (USG) escorts and Tiger Team, is responsible for the planning, preparation, conduct, and monitoring of personnel interviews requested by the IIT. Requests for interviews with foreign nationals employed by the U.S. will be handled on a case-by-case basis.

BACKGROUND

Under the inspection provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), members of the IIT have the right to interview personnel from the inspected facility. The treaty is unclear on how these interviews are to be conducted, other than to say that the inspected party has the right to have escorts present during such interviews.

In preparing to meet this requirement it is important to remember that the inspectors are conducting the interviews under the provisions of a treaty to which the United States is a full and willing party. Thus, it is important that the interviews be conducted in a cooperative and professional manner that, to the extent possible, assists in alleviating the concerns expressed in the inspection team mandate.

The Inspection Ops Center will serve as the focal point for coordinating and monitoring all personnel interviews. Procedures should be ready for implementation NLT Phase 3 of the inspection.

The Inspection Ops Center will ensure arrangements for interviews are coordinated with the IIT and the USG Escort Team. It will also ensure proper escort representation, monitor the progress of interviews, and react to further requests for information resulting from the interviews.

The objectives of the interview are to:

- Provide the inspector with enough information to convince them that the facility is not in violation of the chemical weapons treaty.
- Avoid raising *more* questions in the inspector's mind by the way a question was answered; i.e., too much hesitancy in answering, or seeming to "hide" information, or mentioning something that may lead the inspector to believe that a violation is being hidden.
- Prevent the inspectors from gaining any information that is unnecessary to satisfy their mandate.

Security Officer/Provost Marshal Personnel Interview Checklist

Phase 1 — Notification/Initial Planning & Response

--	--	--	--	--	--

PHASE 1
PHASE 2
PHASE 3
PHASE 4
PHASE 5
PHASE 6

1. **Read/review guidelines for answering questions at the end of this checklist with Commanding Officer/Challenge Inspection Officer (CO/CIO)**

The International Inspection Team (IIT) will be requested to identify those desired for interviews with a recommended 24-hour lead-time. The requests for interviews may be granted if consistent with privacy regulations, and if the individual interviewees grant consent for the interviews.

Phase 2 — Initial Preparation Activities

--	--	--	--	--	--

PHASE 1
PHASE 2
PHASE 3
PHASE 4
PHASE 5
PHASE 6

2. **Coordinate with CIO, local Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) agent, Operations Security (OPSEC) Officer, and Tiger Team to:**
 - (a) **Locate a suitable site for interview preparation.....**
 - (b) **Locate a suitable site where interviews could be held.....**
 - (c) **Advise all personnel requested for interviews that they have the right to decline the interview requests, and that the decision to do so will not be held against them**

NOTES

(d) Advise all personnel requested for interviews of their rights and options regarding format of the interview. See guidelines for answering questions at the end of this appendix

3. Have all appropriate personnel review this appendix and the guidelines for answering questions

Phase 3 — Perimeter Negotiations/Final Preparations



Phase 3 is the time period from IIT arrival at the base to the crossing of the final perimeter by the IIT. Crossing of the perimeter can be as much as 72 hours after the IIT arrives at the activity.

4. If the IIT identifies interviewees during the point of entry negotiations, begin preparing those individuals

Phase 4 — Inspection Activities



Phase 4 is the time period from the IIT crossing of the final perimeter to the conclusion of the inspection by the IIT. Phase 4 can last up to 84 hours.

NOTES

5. **Request that the USG Host Team notify the Inspection Ops Center of any individuals identified for interviews by the IIT as soon as possible**

6. **Coordinate a time for specific interviews to take place**

Note: Interviews should not be conducted on the spot because of the lack of a controlled environment, interruption to operations, possible safety concerns, and the need to prepare interviewees before an interview.

7. **Prepare selected interviewees**

8. **Tape recording of interviews**

It is Department of Defense policy that interviews not be video- or audio-recorded.

9. **Questions posed in the interview should be noted and integrated into the preparation of follow-on interviewees**

Phases 5 and 6 — Post-Inspection Activities & Recovery



PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 PHASE 5 PHASE 6

Phase 5 is the 24-hour period following the conclusion of IIT inspection. Phase 6 commences upon IIT departure.

NOTES

10. Review results of the interview

Look for potential security loss and for information potentially impacting on the IIT assessment.

11. Prepare a summary of questions asked, answers provided, and an assessment of security losses for the CO

GUIDELINES FOR ANSWERING QUESTIONS

- Answer questions relevant to the inspectors' mandate or purpose of the inspection.
- Do not give answers that are classified. If an answer is classified, consult with appropriate member(s) of the Host Team before responding.
- If you do not know the answer, say you don't know. Don't guess or speculate.
- Do not answer hypothetical questions.
- Answers should be as specific and brief as possible.
- Do not volunteer unrequested information.
- Do not mention other personnel or activities involved in or with knowledge of a place or activity. Do not discuss activities, facilities, or personnel outside the defined site/facility/activity being inspected.
- Do not guess or speculate on what theoretically could be accomplished with the personnel, resources, and/or equipment available at your facility.
- Try to avoid appearing hesitant or evasive. If you cannot answer a question, be straightforward with the reason. Evasive behavior is counterproductive to the process as it is likely to be used by the inspectors to justify unwarranted concerns.

NOTES

Examples:

Logical interview questions may concern your background training, daily activities, job responsibilities, any on the job accidents you may have been involved in.

Q: "What type of munitions are stored where you work?"

A: State type of munitions specific to location asked for.

Q: "Can you configure an F-14 to carry chemical munitions?"

A: (Don't speculate!) "That is not my area of expertise, I wouldn't really know."

Q: "What qualifications do you have to work in the munitions storage building?"

A: "I am qualified in XXXXX."

Q: "What qualifications do others have?"

A: "I don't know; each person may be different and you'd have to ask them."

Q: "Have you ever worked with chemical munitions?"

A: "No." or "Once in 1969, but I am no longer qualified."

NOTES

Appendix S5

SAMPLING

Appendix S5 provides an explanation of the International Inspection Team's (IIT) treaty rights to take samples, procedures for the facility to follow, and guidance to ensure that the facility's sensitive activities are protected from a sampling request during a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspection.

RESPONSIBILITIES

The Challenge Inspection Officer (CIO) is responsible for coordination of all sampling requests.

BACKGROUND

Based on draft DOD planning guidance, the conduct of sampling and analysis will be accomplished by deploying personnel from the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic Analytical Center (ECBFAC) to be available to assist the facility throughout the Challenge Inspection. ECBFAC Treaty Laboratory's Sampling & Analysis (S&A) Team, equipped with a suite of transportable sampling and analysis instrumentation, will include the capability to collect samples, prepare samples, package samples for potential transport, and/or the analysis of samples in support of verification measures. Technical experts will also be made available to advise on the potential information that may or may not be acquired through particular samples. ECBFAC Treaty Laboratory sampling procedures are covered in separate documentation.

Sampling, including soil, air, and effluent, is a significant tool available within the CWC as part of the inspection process to determine compliance or non-compliance with the treaty's provisions. Sampling can also be a threat to sensitive or proprietary activities at installations subject to a challenge inspection. Sampling presents unique challenges to facilities having a Host Country. The IIT may request to take samples from areas outside of U.S. control. Local laws, customs, and sensitivities must all be considered. Throughout the following discussion, the inspected State Party should examine responding to sampling requests by the inspection team in four ways:

- Is the area where sampling is requested under U.S. control?
- Is the sampling area accessible to the general public at any time?
- Does the sampling location place sensitive activities at risk?
- Does the timing of the request put other facility activities in the area at the time sampling will be conducted?

SAMPLING RIGHTS CONTAINED IN THE CWC

The treaty explicitly grants the IIT the right to take air, soil, and effluent samples within a 50-meter band outside the inspection perimeter using prescribed equipment to document such facts that are related to possible CWC compliance/noncompliance. Additionally, the treaty specifically allows the IIT the right to request samples inside the inspection perimeter. The treaty balances these rights by allowing the inspected State Party measures to monitor, or limit, the intrusiveness of the sampling activity. The issue of sampling within the 50 meter band outside the inspection perimeter may place the IIT outside of U.S. controlled property. In that case, Host Country officials will likely provide escorts and determine sampling policies.

Exit-Monitoring Activities and Securing the Site

Opportunities exist for taking samples before the IIT crosses the perimeter. Upon its arrival at the alternate or final perimeter, the IIT has a right to secure and document the integrity of the inspection perimeter. During this activity, sampling is one tool available to the IIT. Exit monitoring may continue during the duration of the inspection, but may not unreasonably hamper normal operations at the facility.

The treaty grants the IIT access within a 50-meter-wide strip measured outward from the perimeter. From this 50-meter-wide strip the IIT may conduct legitimate inspection procedures, including sampling. The treaty allows the IIT to take its own samples as well as operate other approved sensors. Procedures for sampling and other IIT monitoring activities outside the perimeter should be addressed during point of entry negotiations. At a minimum, the facility should request that they be informed and allowed to monitor any sampling that takes place outside the perimeter within the 50-meter band. The inspected State Party should also suggest that duplicate samples be taken and make every effort to complete analysis while the IIT is on site. Again, these activities may be under the purview of the Host Country, not USG officials.

Inspection Procedures

Sampling within the final inspection perimeter may be requested by the IIT and is dependent upon managed access negotiations. It is important to remember that the IIT has a mandate to collect and document such facts as are related to a noncompliance concern. Managed access negotiations, on a case-by-case basis, will produce an agreement on the scope and nature of sampling necessary to provide sufficient relevant facts to clarify treaty compliance. The opportunity for sampling during inspection activities can occur in two instances:

- To document a structure or process that supports compliance/noncompliance
- If an ambiguity is raised that cannot be resolved.

The sampling procedures inside the perimeter are clear. The IIT may request that a sample is taken, but members of the inspected State Party actually take the sample. The IIT will provide in its preliminary factual finding report a list of the samples taken during a challenge inspection. It is not yet clear if a capability to instantly analyze samples will be available, but both the IIT and the inspected State Party will retain duplicate samples. Provisions for off-site analysis, if any, have not yet been defined. This will have implications for the custody, storage, and transportation of samples.

GUIDANCE FOR SAMPLING DURING A CHALLENGE INSPECTION

General

As noted in the introduction to this appendix, the treaty allows the inspected State Party the right to protect sensitive national security and proprietary information not related to CWC compliance. Through planning, preparation and close coordination with the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic Analytical Center (ECBFAC) Sampling and Analysis (S&A) Team, the facility should successfully manage any request for samples that may arise during the conduct of the inspection. Operational security concerns pertaining to sampling vulnerabilities should be disseminated, as appropriate, to the chain of command, Inspection Ops Center Staff, and escorts.

A key to effectively executing the sampling procedures is a thorough understanding of Host Country rights and concerns, the education of escort personnel regarding what sampling support is to be provided by the facility, and a general knowledge of any vulnerabilities existing at the facility. Armed with this knowledge, escort personnel can help facilitate communications among the inspection team, national escorts, the ECBFAC S&A Team, the facility sampling team, and the Inspection Ops Center.

Exit-Monitoring Activities and Securing the Site

When the IIT assumes responsibility for exit monitoring and securing the site, it has the right to take samples. The IIT may also request samples at exits and of exiting traffic. The area in which this activity can occur is limited to a 50-meter-wide band measured outward from the boundary of the inspection perimeter. It is ambiguous in the treaty exactly who controls the operation of sampling equipment during this activity. In practice, an agreement may need to be reached between the IIT and the inspected State Party regarding sampling procedures during the IIT's exit monitoring activities.

For facilities located in a Host Country, this is further complicated by possible Host Country involvement. It is recommended that the facility adopt procedures similar to those outlined in this document. See the following paragraph, "Inspection Procedures," for perimeter sampling activities.

Inspection Procedures

The guiding principle for responses to requests for sampling inside the perimeter should be based on our right to protect sensitive national security and proprietary information. A balance exists within the treaty that weighs the inspection team's mandate to collect and document sufficient facts as they are related to possible CWC compliance/noncompliance and this right to protect non-related

information. In any case, provisions governing sampling should be included in the inspection plan and should be clarified as necessary during negotiations.

1. Managed Access: Local prohibitions established by the facility (or higher command) designed to protect sensitive information may come into conflict with a request for a sample by the IIT. Each request will be handled on a case-by-case basis. The following questions are provided to assist in the decision-making process on the part of command personnel in allowing the request:

- Is the object (place) clearly related to the stated compliance concern?
- Is there a concrete link between the request and the inspection team's mandate?
- Is the object (place) readily accessible to the general public?
- Is there a national security or proprietary concern in the requested sample?

It is anticipated that no one person will be able to adequately address all aspects of these questions, but ultimate decision authority will rest with the Commanding Officer (CO).

2. Facility Sampling Team: It is recommended that the facility, during its preparation activities, form a team to respond to sampling requests throughout the inspection. Ideally, this team should be composed of personnel from medical, environmental, or occupational health and safety backgrounds. The team will need to be familiar with the scientific methods supporting the sampling from air, soil, and effluent sources. The team will need to be equipped with the following items:

- Maps of the perimeter and inspectable area
- Communications devices
- Provisions to determine geographic coordinates and wind direction/speed
- Sample collection devices (i.e., plastic bags, test tubes, storage containers)
- Protective equipment
- Secure work space.

The S&A Team should take any samples within the perimeter with the assistance of the facility team and necessary escort personnel. Suggested procedures for sampling inside the perimeter are stated in the Sampling Procedures Checklist. These procedures will need to be agreed upon by the IIT during negotiations and should be included in the inspection plan. The facility sampling team should be given the right to operate the IIT's sampling equipment. It is not clear if any training of the sampling support team will be necessary. While exact procedures are still being defined, two samples should be taken, one for the IIT and the other for the inspected State Party. Each sample should be dated and signed by both parties to clearly establish its provenance. Storage, custody, and transportation of the samples will need to be determined through negotiations.

3. Sample Analysis: Instant analysis equipment could be available to the inspection team. Its use

will be specified, through negotiation, in the inspection plan. Provisions for transporting samples off site for analysis will also be determined in negotiations. If samples are taken to an off-site laboratory for analysis, special handling and transportation measures for samples may need to be implemented by the facility.

Inspection Ops Center

Sampling Procedures Checklist

Initiate these actions upon receipt of a request from the inspection team to take a sample. Sampling and analysis support will be provided by the Edgewood Chemical Biological Forensic Analytical Center (ECBFAC) Sampling and Analysis (S&A) team. The facility should provide a sampling team to assist the S&A Team and as a backup in the event the ECBFAC S&A team is unable to participate.

1. **Notify chain of command of the request**

Coordinate the evaluation of the request (refer to the guidelines presented in the Inspection Procedures section of this appendix).

2. **Notify facility sample team to report to Inspection Ops Center before deploying to site of sample request**

3. **Provide the following support to the S&A Team**

- **Site diagrams:** A minimum of two site diagram wall charts of the site to be inspected. The diagrams will be used for general orientation of the team and to mark specific locations of sampling conducted during perimeter activities and the inspection. If designation of the sampling locations is not standard S&A Team procedure, it will be requested to do so.
- **Workspace:** A work area with a minimum of 150 square feet is required to set up analytical equipment and to be used as a workspace for the S&A Team. The workspace should have: a door with a minimum width of 41 inches to accommodate analytical equipment; adequate lighting; some level of climatic control (50 to 85 °F); and should be capable of being secured. Primary and alternative workspaces should also be designated.
- **Power:** The workspace should have 120 Volt/60Hz with a minimum of four each 20-amp circuits with standard duplex outlets (minimum of three). If this is not available, the S&A Team must be notified as soon as possible to plan for the deployment of transportable electric generators.

NOTES

- **Chairs/Tables:** Three large tables and a minimum of four chairs are desired.
- **Forklift:** 1 forklift (500-lb capacity).
- **Protective personnel equipment:** S&A Team members will come equipped with work boots, lab coats, safety glasses, and laboratory gloves. The S&A Team will also provide additional protective equipment necessary for the conduct of sampling.
- **Waste disposal:** The analysis of environmental samples will produce small amounts of hazardous chemical waste. Facility personnel will be responsible for handling waste disposal. The S&A Team will be capable of providing support in identifying and labeling the hazardous waste.
- **Analysis of nitric acid:** Should an analysis of the nitric acid recovery solution be necessary, the S&A Team may need support from facility sampling team to determine levels of chromium, although this requirement is unlikely. In addition, a method for the analysis of old solutions, colorimetric, ion chromatography, etc, may also be necessary. S&A capabilities for analysis of this solution are roughly based on an organic extraction of the solution followed by Gas Chromatography/ Mass Spectrometer (GC/MS) analysis. In this case, only volatile, extractable, chromatographable materials would be observed.
- **Security/Safety/Surety:** All S&A Team members are familiar with ECBFAC site regulations regarding security, safety, and surety. Site-specific briefings on the above are required to be performed by the facility. Necessary badges and vehicle passes are also required from the facility.
- **Phones:** One DSN-capable and one on-site/ off-site call capable phone are desired in the workspace.

4. **Notify the Base Escort Coordinator when clearance to take a sample is obtained**

5. **Enter in the Inspection Ops Center log the time, date, and location of the sample**

The duplicate samples and Inspection Sampling form will be forwarded by the facility sampling team personnel to the Inspection Ops Center.

NOTES

6. Complete appropriate section of Record of Inspection Sampling form (Figure S5-1) and secure sample.....

7. Record entry in Inspection Ops Center Master Sample Log (Figure S5-2)

8. Conduct a review of samples with appropriate program/ security personnel.....

If approved for release, provide the IIT's copy of the sample to the USG Escort Team Leader for forwarding to the IIT.

9. Compare the Inspection Ops Center Master Sample Log with the inspector's list

When the IIT presents its preliminary factual findings report, a list of the samples taken will be included.

NOTES

Facility Sampling Team

Procedures Checklist

Initiate these actions upon receipt of a request from the inspection team to take a sample. All requests for samples will be coordinated through the Inspection Ops Center.

1. **Upon notification of a sampling request, deploy to the Inspection Ops Center**
2. **Receive authorization to collect sample, deploy to sampling site**.....
3. **Upon agreement with the International Inspection Team (IIT), and in coordination with the Sample & Analysis (S&A) Team, provide assistance in collecting the sample**
4. **Determine if the sample is acceptable to the IIT member**

If acceptable, then assist in collecting another sample. If not acceptable, determine from the inspector what would be acceptable. Take a duplicate sample once acceptability has been reached.
5. **Sign, seal, and time/date each sample, have the IIT member sign**.....
6. **Complete Record of Inspection Sampling form (Figure S5-1)**.....
7. **Forward all samples and associated forms to the Inspection Ops Center**

Conduct a review of samples with appropriate program/security personnel. If approved for release, provide the IIT's copy of the sample to the USG Escort Team Leader for forwarding to the IIT.

NOTES

Escort Personnel

Sampling Procedures Checklist

Initiate these actions upon receipt of a request from the inspection team to take a sample. All requests for samples will be coordinated through the Inspection Ops Center.

1. **Notify Inspection Ops Center of request**.....

If necessary, use a landline. Briefly describe nature of request and the contents of the requested sample, if known. If appropriate and secure, notify the Inspection Ops Center of any known sampling vulnerabilities.

2. **Await arrival of ECBFAC S&A Team/facility sampling team**

3. **Obtain clearance to take a sample from Inspection Ops Center**

NOTES

RECORD OF INSPECTION SAMPLING		
TO BE COMPLETED BY SAMPLING TEAM PERSONNEL		
Time/Date:	Sample No:	Recorded by:
Wind direction/speed:	Geographic coordinate:	
Sample authorization received from:		
Description of sample: <input type="checkbox"/> Air <input type="checkbox"/> Soil <input type="checkbox"/> Effluent <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify)	Sampling method (brief description):	
Handling and storage Instructions:		
Has sample been signed and dated by both inspector and escort? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Comments:	
<i>RETURN ALL SAMPLES AND THIS FORM TO INSPECTION OPS CENTER</i>		
TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTION OPS CENTER PERSONNEL		
Record entry in Master Sample Log <input type="checkbox"/>	Sample secured per instructions <input type="checkbox"/>	
Actions verified by:		

Figure S5-1

NOTES

NOTES

Appendix S6

PHOTOGRAPHY

Appendix S6 provides an explanation of the International Inspection Team's (IIT) treaty rights to photograph, and guidance to ensure that facility's sensitive activities are protected from photographic threat during a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspection.

RESPONSIBILITIES

The Challenge Inspection Officer (CIO) is responsible for coordination of all photography requests.

BACKGROUND

Photography, including still and video, is a powerful tool available within the CWC as part of the inspection process to determine compliance with the treaty's provisions. Photography is also a paramount threat to sensitive activities at facilities subject to CWC challenge inspections. Throughout the following discussion, it should be remembered that areas of the facility that could be photographed by the public during air shows, open houses, dependents day activities, etc., are not threatened by the presence of the IIT. Those procedures that are normally taken during public events that allow photography on the facility should, therefore, be considered as a valid starting point for implementation

PHOTOGRAPHY RIGHTS CONTAINED IN THE CWC

The treaty explicitly grants the IIT the right to take photographs using prescribed equipment to document such facts that are related to possible CWC compliance/noncompliance. The treaty balances this right by allowing the inspected State Party measures to monitor, or limit, the intrusiveness of the photographic activity. The CWC provides several opportunities for photography during a challenge inspection.

Photo Opportunities

Several opportunities exist for taking photographs and videos during a CWC challenge inspection. Before the IIT's arrival at the requested perimeter, the inspected State Party conducts self-monitoring at all vehicle exits. Self-monitoring information may include still or video photography. When the IIT arrives at the alternative or final perimeter, they have a right to secure and document the integrity of the inspection perimeter. During this activity, photography (both still and video) is a tool available to the IIT for exit-monitoring purposes. This activity may continue during the duration of the inspection, but may not unreasonably hamper normal operations at the facility.

The treaty also grants the inspection teams access in a 50-meter-wide strip of land measured outward from the perimeter. From this 50-meter-wide strip the IIT may conduct legitimate inspection procedures, including still photography and the making of video recordings. The treaty allows the IIT to compose its own photographs as well as operate other approved sensors with the provision that all monitoring, including photography, be directed inward toward the facility. All procedures for photography and other inspection team monitoring activities should normally be addressed during point of entry negotiations.

Photography *within* the final inspection perimeter may be requested by the IIT and is dependent upon managed access negotiations. It is important to remember that the IIT has a mandate to collect and document such facts as are related to a noncompliance concern. The IIT may not take photographs that are clearly not related to possible noncompliance of the CWC, unless the inspected State Party expressly requests the IIT to do so.

Inspection Procedures

Managed access negotiations, on a case-by-case basis, will produce an agreement on the scope and nature of photographic access necessary to provide sufficient relevant facts to clarify treaty compliance. The opportunity for photography during inspection activities can occur in two instances:

- To document a structure or process that supports compliance/noncompliance
- An ambiguity is raised that cannot be resolved.

The photography procedures inside the perimeter are clear. The IIT may request that a photograph be taken (description to include framing, size, and the photograph's content), but members of the inspected State Party control the operation of the camera. The IIT shall provide in its preliminary factual finding report a list of the photographs taken during a challenge inspection. The capability to take instant development photographs must be available, and both the IIT and the inspected State Party retain one copy of every photograph.

GUIDANCE FOR PHOTOGRAPHY DURING A CHALLENGE INSPECTION

General

Containing the threat posed by photography during a challenge inspection depends on the ability to make rapid judgments by the chain of command and the training of escort personnel. As noted in the introduction to this appendix, no photography threat is posed by the IIT in areas of the installation accessible to the general public or viewable from outside of the facility boundary. Precautions normally taken to prepare the facility for an open house, air show, or Dependents' Day activities should be adequate for these areas.

The treaty allows the inspected State Party the right to protect sensitive national security and proprietary information not related to CWC compliance. This is a powerful tool available in managed access negotiations to limit the intrusiveness of photography and other activities performed by the IIT. Operational security concerns pertaining to photography vulnerabilities should be disseminated, as appropriate, to the chain of command, Inspection Ops Center staff, and escorts.

The most important link in executing effective photography procedures is educating escort personnel about the photography vulnerabilities existing at the installation. Armed with this knowledge, escort personnel can facilitate communications among the IIT, national escorts, and Inspection Ops Center.

Exit Monitoring Activities and Securing the Site

Procedures for photography by the inspected State Party during the installation's self-monitoring period are detailed in Tab F, Self-Monitoring. It is recommended that the Operations Security Officer assess the self-monitoring photography provisions (i.e., camera angles), especially for the making of videos. When assessing photography vulnerabilities along the perimeter and at exit portals, it is important to remember the perspective of the IIT (from the outside looking in) vice the perspective of the installation (from the inside looking out).

When the IIT assumes responsibility for exit monitoring and securing the site, the IIT has the right to conduct procedures consistent with its mandate. This includes the taking of still photographs and making of videos. The area in which this activity can occur is limited to a 50-meter-wide band measured from the boundary of the inspection perimeter.

The IIT appears to have the right to take photographs and make video recordings of exits and exiting traffic. It is ambiguous in the treaty exactly who controls the operation of photography equipment for other aspects of perimeter activities. In practice, an agreement may need to be reached between

the IIT and the inspected State Party regarding photography procedures during the IIT's exit-monitoring activities.

If the inspection perimeter coincides with the installation's boundary with public areas, the photography vulnerability is considerably lessened. The photography vulnerability increases if the inspection perimeter bisects areas of the facility and impacts should be assessed.

Inspection Procedures

The position guiding responses to requests for photography inside the perimeter should be based on the right granted by the treaty to the inspected State Party to protect sensitive national security and proprietary information. A balance exists within the treaty that weighs the IIT's mandate to collect and document sufficient facts as are related to possible CWC compliance/noncompliance and this right to protect non-related information. In any case, provisions governing photography should be included in the inspection plan and should be clarified as necessary during negotiations.

Upon arrival at the inspected facility, all cameras will remain either in the inspector work spaces or local equipment storage area except when carried by inspectors for specific inspection activity. Escorts will ensure the cameras are not used except for specified inspection purposes.

All inspection related photographic equipment brought on site by the IIT for inspection purposes will undergo the necessary locally employed security and camera pass procedures per existing facility instruction, agreement or transitional verification arrangements.

In general, the following guidelines are applicable for photography during all inspections.

- a. Photographs will be allowed only if each is justified as directly supporting the inspection mandate and the object and purpose of the inspection. Photographs not specifically so justified will not be authorized. For all inspection team photograph requests that are denied, for record purposes, the Host Team will record the request, inspection team justification for the request, and reason for denial of the request.
- b. Requests for photographs will only be accepted from the inspection team chief or from one of their assistants previously designated. The taking of any photographs will be allowed only with the express permission of both the facility commander and the Host Team leader. The Host Team, for efficiency and security, should have a representative at, or dispatch one to, any location where the inspection team has requested a photograph be taken. That individual shall be qualified to make decisions pertaining to those actions associated with photography required of the Host Team at that location.

- c. As a part of the resolution of ambiguities, per the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), if questions relating to an object or building located within the inspection site are not resolved to the satisfaction of the inspection team, the object or structure will, if requested, be photographed for the purposes of clarifying and documenting its nature and function.
- d. The Host Team will ensure that no photography includes classified, proprietary, or physical security information systems or objects. Photographs will not encompass areas outside the declared perimeter. Photographs will only include the specific objects requested and agreed.
- e. The installation has the right to object to the use of photographic equipment in specific areas, buildings, or structures, if such use would be incompatible with safety or fire regulations. Every effort, however, will be made to determine alternate means for satisfying the justified request for a photograph. Should, for safety reasons, a photograph not be allowed, the Host Team will be prepared to provide in writing to the inspection team reasons for the denial.
- f. The Host Team will stipulate that any photographs taken as described in a and c above are to be protected by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at OPCW security classification level.

Local prohibitions established by the facility (or higher command element) designed to protect sensitive information may come into conflict with a request for a photograph by the IIT. A case-by-case judgment will be necessary to rapidly resolve the issue, allow the IIT to carry out its legitimate treaty rights, as well as protect sensitive information. The following questions are designed to assist inspection chain of command personnel in developing such judgments:

- Is the object (place) clearly related to the stated compliance concern?
- Is there a concrete link between the request and the IIT's mandate?
- Is the object (place) readily viewable to the general public?
- Is there a national security or proprietary concern in the requested photograph?

Procedures for Photography

- a. To take a photograph, once an inspection team has requested what it wants taken and the Host Team has agreed that it should be taken, the inspection team will frame and focus the photograph. The qualified Host Team representative will review the frame to ensure it only includes the requested object and does not include sensitive or unrelated material. Once the frame is agreed, the Host Team will shoot two photographs (prints).
- b. The inspection team and Host Team will each review the photographs to determine that the photograph contains what it is supposed to and does not contain what it should not and that

the two photographs are identical.

- c. If the photographs do not meet the satisfaction of both sides, they will be destroyed and the procedures in a and b above will be repeated.
- d. Once Host Team approval of the photographs is given, each side will retain one print of the photograph, and it will be affixed to their respective copies of the inspection preliminary report of findings. The escort team for each of its prints will annotate the date, Greenwich Mean Time, location, and subject of the print, and an inspector and a member of escort team will each sign both copies of the photographs.
- e. Both the USG escort team and the NTIP Tiger Team will have film and instant development type cameras available for use if needed.

Specific Guidelines for Photographs

The inspection team will be allowed a photographic record of seals and tags it employs during the inspection.

- 1. For photography of seals and tags, the inspectors will be allowed to frame and, after review of the framing by the escort team, take the photograph.
- 2. The framed photograph will be confined to that area necessary to record position and/or designation of the seal or tag for record and reference purposes.
- 3. The inspection and Host Teams will each retain a copy of the photograph of each seal or tag, following the procedures in Procedures for Photographing (paragraph d above).
- 4. In the event the inspection team utilizes fiber optic seals, the photographic image is taken as an integral part of the seal system. The Host Team will not review frames or retain copies of the images.
- 5. Conduct of photography of seals and tags will be closely monitored by the escort teams, and authority to accomplish this photography delegated to the host/escort team subgroups.

Inspection Ops Center

Photography Procedures Checklist

Initiate these actions upon receipt of a request from the International Inspection Team (IIT) to take a photograph inside the inspection perimeter. This procedure establishes the provenance of the photograph.

1. **Evaluate the request for a photograph**.....

Coordinate the evaluation of the request (refer to the guidelines presented in the Inspection Procedures section of this appendix).
2. **Notify the base escort of clearance to take a photograph, if allowed**
3. **Assign a unique photo number (Figure S6-1) to each photo**
4. **Enter in the Inspection Ops Center Record of Inspection Photography form (Figure S6-2) the time/date and location of photograph**.....
5. **Complete appropriate section of form and secure photograph**
6. **Record entry in Inspection Ops Center Master Photo Log (Figure S6-1)**

After the copies of the photograph and Record of Inspection Photography form are forwarded by base escort personnel, do the following:

NOTES

7. **Conduct a review of photographs with appropriate program/
security personnel.....**

If approved for release, provide the IIT's copy of the photograph to the United States Government (USG) Escort Team Leader for forwarding to the IIT Leader.

8. **Compare the Inspection Ops Center Master Photo Log (Figure S6-1) with the
inspector's list**

When the IIT presents its preliminary factual findings report, a list of the photographs taken will be included for comparison.

9. **Provide Operations Security personnel access to copies of the photographs,
Record of Inspection Photography form (Figure S6-2), and Inspection Ops
Center Master Photo Log (Figure S6-1).....**

NOTES

Base Escort's Photography Procedures Checklist

Initiate these actions upon receipt of a request from the International Inspection Team (IIT) to take a photograph inside the inspection perimeter. This procedure establishes the provenance of the photograph.

1. **Notify Inspection Ops Center of request**.....

If necessary use a landline. Briefly describe contents and background of proposed photograph. If appropriate and secure, notify the Inspection Operations Center of any known photography vulnerabilities.

2. **Obtain clearance to take a photo from Inspection Ops Center**

3. **Upon agreement with the IIT member, take one photo**.....

4. **Determine if it is acceptable to the IIT member**

The inspection team and Host Team will each review the photographs to determine that the photograph contains what it is supposed to and does not contain what it should not and that the two photographs are identical.

If the photographs do not meet the satisfaction of both sides, they will be destroyed and the procedures repeated.

5. **Sign and time/date each photograph**

6. **Have the IIT member sign each photograph**

7. **Complete Record of Inspection Photography form (Figure S6-2)**.....

8. **Forward both photographs to the Inspection Ops Center**.....

The Inspection Ops Center will conduct a final review and determine approval for release. The USG Escort Team Leader will deliver IIT's copy to the IIT Chief.

NOTES

NOTES

RECORD OF INSPECTION PHOTOGRAPHY		
TO BE COMPLETED BY ESCORT PERSONNEL		
Time/Date:	Photo No:	Recorded by:
Photo authorization received from:		
Brief description of photo contents:		
Have both photos been signed and dated by both inspector and escort? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Comments:	
<i>RETURN BOTH COPIES OF PHOTO TO INSPECTION OPS CENTER</i>		
TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTION OPS CENTER PERSONNEL		
Record entry in Master Photo Log <input type="checkbox"/>	Photo secured in Inspection Ops Center <input type="checkbox"/>	
Has photo been approved for release? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	If yes, has one copy been provided to the USG team chief? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Actions verified by:		

FIGURE S6-2

Record of Inspection Photography Form

NOTES